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SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICIES – A REVIEW OF 
COMMON AGENCY MODELS 
 
The purpose of the study is on one hand to go through the different ways to model the political 
economy of policy formation, and on the other hand to take a critical look at the most commonly used 
model, namely that of Grossman and Helpman, in order to analyse how it performs in capturing the 
mechanics of policy formation in general sense.   
 
The economics literature refers to a situation in which an agent takes an action that simultaneously 
affects several principals as a relationship of common agency. In such situations, the principals 
typically design payment schedules that give the agent an incentive to take their interests into account. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) have formalized this menu-auction game in a general framework. The 
contribution of Grossman and Helpman was to apply the menu-auction framework to model trade 
policy making. Later on, their common agency model has found several applications on other policy 
areas.  
 
This study takes first a retrospective look at endogenous policy models by setting the Grossman-
Helpman model as the starting point. The focus is then shifted to models that have emerged after the 
introduction of the Protection for Sale article. Two main questions arise: how does the Grossman-
Helpman model relate to earlier research on endogenous policies, and how has the common agency 
tradition evolved in the theoretical literature during the past decade? The study is conducted in the 
form of a literature review with an emphasis on theoretical research literature.  
 
As a result of the survey, it can be concluded that the Grossman-Helpman model offers a rich and 
flexible way to model endogenous policies. In comparison to earlier research, it does not suffer from 
black boxes which, in contrast, are the burden of tariff-formation and political support models. 
However, the Grossman-Helpman model is far from being a complete picture of real world 
interactions in the political arena. The common agency literature that builds on the Grossman-
Helpman model includes studies with for instance endogenous lobby formation, asymmetric 
information, and hierarchical governments. Each of these offers several modelling possibilities and 
new insights of the political game. Some other augmented versions of the basic model, such as 
dynamic settings, multiple agents, non-quasilinear preferences and the inclusion of a foreign 
government, are also briefly revised. Issues that still lack a proper treatment in common agency 
models include for instance the multiplicity of influencing channels, the role of feelings and emotions, 
the importance of credibility and reputation as well as the specificities of different political regimes.  
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auction, Endogenous policy 
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ETURYHMÄT JA POLITIIKAN ENDOGEENISYYS – KATSAUS YHTEISEN AGENTIN 
MALLEIHIN 
 
Tutkimuksen tarkoitus on toisaalta kartoittaa tapoja mallintaa politiikan muodostusta poliittisten 
päättäjien ja eturyhmien välillä, ja toisaalta arvioida kriittisesti näiden mallien, etenkin laajiten 
käytetyn Grossman-Helpman-mallin sopivuutta politiikan muodostuksen mallintamiseen ja 
todellisuuden kuvaamiseen.  
 
Taloustieteellisessä kirjallisuudessa tilannetta, jossa agentti tekee päätöksen joka vaikuttaa 
samanaikaisesti useaan päämieheen kutsutaan yleisesti yhteisen agentin ongelmaksi. Tällaisissa 
tilanteissa päämiehet tyypillisesti tarjoavat agentille rahallisia tarjouksia, joiden tarkoituksena on 
houkutella agentti huomioimaan eturyhmän intressit päätöksenteossa. Bernheim ja Whinston (1986) 
ovat mallintaneet tämän menu auction-pelin formaalisti yleisellä tasolla. Grossmanin ja Helpmanin 
panos yhteisen agentin kirjallisuuteen oli hyödyntää menu auction-kehikkoa kauppapolitiikan 
muodostuksen mallintamiseen. Heidän yhteisen agentin malliaan on myöhemmin hyödynnetty 
kauppapolitiikan lisäksi monilla muillakin politiikan aloilla.  
 
Tässä tutkimuksessa päähuomio on siinä, miten politiikan muodostusta, ns. poliittista peliä, on 
mallinnettu. Työssä luodaan sekä historiaa että nykypäivää luotaava katsaus politiikan muodostuksen 
mallintamiseen ottamalla lähtökohdaksi Grossman-Helpman-malli. Kaksi keskeistä kysymystä nousee 
esiin: miten Grossman-Helpman-malli peilautuu aikaisempien endogeenisen politiikan mallien kanssa, 
ja miten Grossmanin ja Helpmanin aloittama yhteisen agentin tutkimussuuntaus poliittisessa 
taloustieteessä on kehittynyt teoreettisessa kirjallisuudessa viimeksi kuluneen vuosikymmenen aikana? 
Tutkimustapana on käytetty kirjallisuuskatsausta keskittyen teoreettiseen lähdekirjallisuuteen. 
 
Katsauksen tuloksena voidaan sanoa Grossman-Helpman-mallin tarjoavan rikkaan ja joustavan tavan 
mallintaa politiikan endogeenisyyttä. Verrattuna aikaisempaan tutkimukseen, Grossmanin ja 
Helpmanin malli ei kärsi nk. mustista laatikoista, jotka ovat ominaisia mm. tariffin muodostuksen 
malleille ja poliittisen tuen malleille. Toisaalta, Grossman-Helpman-malli on kaukana täydellisyydestä 
yrittäessään kuvata lobbaajien ja poliitikoiden kanssakäymistä todellisessa maailmassa. Yhteisen 
agentin kirjallisuus, joka on rakentunut Grossman-Helpman-mallin ympärille, sisältää tutkimuksia 
jotka käsittelevät mm. eturyhmien endogeenistä muodostumista, epäsymmetristä informaatiota sekä 
hierarkkisia hallintorakenteita. Kukin näistä näkökulmista tarjoaa monia uusia 
mallinnusmahdollisuuksia sekä valaisevia piirteitä poliittisesta pelistä. Edellisten lisäksi luodaan lyhyt 
katsaus myös muutamiin muihin uudistettuihin versioihin perus Grossman-Helpman-mallista. 
 
Näkökulmia, joita ei vielä ole käsitelty yhteisen agentin malleissa ovat mm. eturyhmien 
vaikutuskanavien moninaisuus, tunteisiin ja irrationaalisuuten perustuva päätöksenteko, hyvän 
maineen tärkeys lobbaamisessa sekä erot institutionaalisissa rakenteissa maiden välillä.    
 
  
 
Avainsanat: Kauppapotiikka,  Poliittinen taloustiede,  Lobbaus,  Intressiryhmä, Yhteinen agentti, 
Menu auction
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1  Introduction 
 
Motivation and background  
The concept of economic efficiency, central in economics, does not always go hand in hand 
with the concept of political efficiency. The latter concept, based on Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989), relates a political action to the chances of election of one of the political parties in an 
economy. As an example, even though in the light of economic theory, free trade would 
produce a clear Pareto improvement compared to protection, completely free trade of goods, 
services, and capital is seldom practiced in reality. This is due to a large extent to special 
interests in economy and politics that conduct trade policy out of the theoretical optimum. 
There are numerous examples of trade disputes between industrialized countries that have 
come about because of national political interests weighing more than bilateral or multilateral 
aggregate gains in economic terms1. Magee et al. (1989) serve an illuminant statement of the 
role of national political interests in relation to economic interests:  
 
“We have regressive policies because income inequality is politically efficient; we 
have lobbies giving funds to parties because that is politically efficient; and we 
have politicians using these funds to educate voters who are underinformed, and 
this is politically efficient. For decades, economists have been stuck on the 
concept of economic efficiency, but this concept is too narrow to provide a proper 
understanding of economic policy formation.” (Magee et al. 1989, xiii) 
 
Simply put, policy outcomes are a result of two main forces: politicians’ desire for re-election, 
and special interest groups’ (SIG) desire for policies favouring their members. Given that 
political decisions and the content of policies usually have distributional effects in the society, 
it is natural that different socio-political groups make effort in order to alter the distribution of 
income to the benefit of the members of the group. Lobbying is attached to every level of 
policy making, and special interest groups, guided by the welfare of the members they 
represent, do not hesitate to use every possibility to influence the political process in their 
favour. The ways to operate of special interest groups are observable, even though most of the 
broad electorate do not recognize their impact in political outcomes, so it is technically 
possible to model the political process under a theoretical model which takes into account the 
presence of lobbying groups.  
                                                
1
 Classical examples include the steel tariff dispute between the U.S. and the EU that escalated in 2002-2003, the 
phase-out of the multi-fibre agreement between the EU and Asian countries, or the EU’s restrictions on 
American imports of genetically modified food, opposed by the European public opinion.  
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A large body of theoretical literature has evolved around the issues of lobbying, interest 
groups, and political economy, and the literature is divided into several subfields. This study 
concentrates on the body of political economy literature centered on common agency theory 
initiated by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Grossman and Helpman (1994) later adopted the 
common agency framework and constructed a thorough model which offers one way to 
describe the process of trade policy formation as a game between a policymaker and interest 
groups. Their workhorse model has afterwards inspired numerous studies on several policy 
fields. Applications of the model concern international trade policies (Grossman and Helpman 
1995a, 1995b), electoral competition (Grossman and Helpman 1996, Prat 2002), public goods 
(Besley and Coate 2001), redistribution (Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997), local public 
goods and fiscal federalism (Mazza and van Winden 2002, Persson 1998), capital taxation 
(Marceau and Smart 2002), environmental policies (Aidt 1998), labour market policies (Rama 
and Tabellini 1998), and legislative bargaining (Persson 1998, Dharmapala 1999).  
 
 
Research questions and methodology 
Common agency models have managed to treat the complexities of the political game in a 
fairly rich and formalized way compared to previous attempts, which is why they have 
become something of a theoretical consensus among researchers, although several alternative 
models still exist.  The goal of this study is to answer one fundamental question: How does 
the existing research using common agency models capture the endogeneity of policy 
making?  
 
 To get some perspective on the topic of endogenous policy models, I first go through 
different typologies of models that have emerged around the theory of endogenous policies. 
Having done that, I concentrate on the most recent and most renowned model of endogenous 
policy formation, namely that of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994). The 
discussion of the Grossman-Helpman (GH) model aims to build some thorough understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the model in order to evaluate its performance. More 
specifically, two main topics arise out of the discussion of the model: what restrictions does 
the model have, and how has the subsequent research literature been able to amend the basic 
model set-up? The study is conducted in the form of a survey on the existing literature.  
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What can be concluded from the discussion of these questions is that the Grossman-Helpman 
model is well constructed and captures the political economy setting somewhat better than 
substituting models such as the tariff-formation function, political support function or 
campaign contribution function approach. The strength of the GH model is that it offers 
microfoundations to the objective functions of the politician and the SIGs and thus serves a 
more complete picture of the decision-making than its predecessors. However, there are issues 
that the model does not address such as the hierarchical structure of the government, 
asymmetric information, and endogenous formation of the lobby groups. These have been 
treated within the common agency model during the past decade, and the models have given 
new insights of the interactions between lobbies and politicians.  
 
Other aspects that are scratched in this study include multiple agents, dynamic models, the 
inclusion of a foreign government, other than truthful equilibria, and non-quasilinear 
preferences. Aspects that have not yet been treated under common agency models are for 
example the combination of contribution and information giving, the role of emotions and 
feelings, the multiplicity of influencing channels, the internal politics of SIGs, the importance 
of credibility and reputation in lobbying, and the differences in institutional structures. 
However, ignoring additional assumptions in the models is sometimes justified if they would 
come at a cost to the traceability of the model.  
 
 
Limitations and structure  
Given that the regulatory conventions for lobbying activities are different between countries 
and involve a lot of detailed information, legal aspects of lobbying are not discussed in this 
study.  I also intend not to cover ethical aspects or welfare considerations of lobbying, 
something that would however be interesting to analyze.  
 
Since the central interest of this study is to get an overview on the way political decision 
making has been formalized in theoretical models, actual policy outcomes and welfare 
considerations of lobbying, through the analysis of the efficiency of equilibria, are not given 
explicit attention. The focus will be on models where interest groups use monetary 
5 
   
    
 
contributions to influence the decisions of a policymaker. Models that incorporate information 
as the primary source of interest group influence will be left out of this study.  
 
In what follows, the terms lobby group, pressure group, and interest group are used 
interchangeably, and the agent in the common agency models is referred to either as the 
politician, the decision maker or the government.  
 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter two presents some general aspects of lobbying and 
special interest group activities. Chapter three provides an overview on the main classes of 
models that have been used to describe endogenous trade policy formation. It serves as a short 
history behind the Grossman-Helpman model and gives an idea of how it compares to the 
other modelling types. The Grossman-Helpman model itself is introduced in chapter four 
along with a presentation of the menu auction framework by Bernheim and Whinston which 
offers the game theoretic backbone of the Grossman-Helpman model. Chapter five introduces 
some subsequent research literature that has taken the basic Grossman-Helpman model some 
steps further adding more realistic assumptions to it or otherwise altering the settings of the 
model. Some ideas for further research are laid out in chapter six before drawing conclusions 
in chapter seven.  
 
2  Special interest groups and lobbying  
As already stated, policies in practice are not set by merely following the economic theory. 
There are distributional consequences that politicians find hard to dismiss. This is to a large 
extent due to special interest groups that wish the policies to be shaped in their favour. As the 
members of these interest groups also represent the voters in parliamentary elections, and, as 
comes clear in this and the subsequent chapters, also financers of political campaigns, 
politicians face pressure to listen to their views.  
 
Before moving on to the activities of SIGs, we could ask what actually is an entity termed 
‘special interest group’. Grossman and Helpman (2001, 75) define special interest groups as 
groups whose members desire policies that would not be considered desirable by the average 
citizen. Thus, any minority group of citizens that shares identifiable characteristics and similar 
concerns on some set of issues might be termed as a special interest group. With this 
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definition, the members of a profession comprise a group, because they share similar aims in 
regard to policies that affect their vocation. Retired persons form a SIG, because their goals 
for health policy and social security differ from those of the average voter. Environmentalists 
represent a special interest to the extent that their concerns for the environment exceed those 
of the average citizen. Similarly, all ethnic, religious, or social groups can be considered as 
representing special interests.    
 
It must however be noted that not all SIGs are organized and not all groups undertake political 
activities. Grossman and Helpman define an ‘organized SIG’ as a body that undertakes 
political actions on behalf of a number of citizens (Grossman & Helpman, 2001, 103). They 
refer to those who are served by a SIG as its ‘members’, whether or not they are formal, dues-
paying members of some organization. The difficulty of getting all these ‘members’ to take 
part in the organization is the essence of the discussion and research of the logic of collective 
action which will be shortly covered in the next chapter.  
 
Organized SIGs undertake a variety of activities to further their political ends. Many of these 
activities entail the collection and dissemination of information but SIGs play also a large role 
in political financing. The next two subsections will take a look at the manifold activities of 
SIGs in the political arena.   
 
2.1  Purposes and forms of activity 
Interest groups engage in a variety of activities to promote their political objectives. 
Grossman and Helpman have discussed the different methods of lobbying in their book on 
special interest politics (2001). In order to give a broad picture of the various forms that 
lobbying activities can take, their findings are summarized here. In general, lobbying is either 
conceptualized as transmission of information or contribution payments to candidates and 
parties. Another way to classify would be to divide the activities of interest groups into direct 
and indirect influence, the former including influencing the behavior of policymakers while 
the latter including the influencing of the behavior of voters. I follow here the division made 
by Grossman and Helpman (2001).  
 
Transmission of information  
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Interest groups are a necessary source of information for policymakers, both because the 
groups are already familiar with many of the technical issues from their everyday 
involvement in the areas where policies are determined and because they are prepared to 
undertake research to produce information that they do not initially have. SIGs provide 
legislators with intelligence of various sorts, including technical information about the likely 
effects of a policy, assessments of how the legislator’s home district will be affected, and 
information on how other legislators are likely to vote. The groups are especially valuable to 
those who are drafting bills, because they are usually familiar with existing laws and 
programs and can provide assistance in wording legislation that accords with existing statutes.  
 
In addition to their efforts to inform and persuade legislators, many SIGs also attempt to 
educate the general public. The reasons for these activities are much the same as for lobbying 
activities. The typical voter, even more than the typical legislator, lacks the expertise and 
technical information needed to evaluate alternative policy proposals. For their part, SIGs are 
happy to serve as educators, because by doing so they can try to shape the public opinion in a 
way that will be beneficial for their cause. Interest group leaders also devote resources to 
educating their own members. Internal communications from the leaders to the members 
serve to alert the latter to issues that are coming before Congress or Parliament, and to inform 
them of how they might be affected by the policies under consideration.  
 
Sometimes, although less frequently, SIGs engage in demonstrations and protests. This way, 
groups try to educate policymakers, group members, and the general public, all at once. A lot 
of information may be transmitted indirectly since the willingness of the participants to bear 
discomfort and inconvenience signals the intensity of their feelings about the issues.  
 
Financial contributions 
Another main SIG tactic is their giving of financial resources to candidates and parties. This 
may be either a substituting or a complementing strategy of SIGs with regard to the 
information sharing. Monetary contributions provide incentives for the lobbied politician to 
deviate from a first best policy choice or from pursuing the wishes of a median voter. While 
politicians may win elections partly because they support popular policies, a successful 
campaign also requires money for advertising and other expenses. It may therefore be in the 
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interest of a politician to adopt positions that are against the interest of the typical voter if he 
is offered a sufficiently large financial contribution to do so.  
 
Campaign giving by special interest groups in the United States has long been regulated by 
federal law. By the early 1970s, many of the unions and other organizations had found a way 
to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the law. They formed political action committees 
(PAC) which are stand-alone organizations that collect voluntary contributions from 
individuals on behalf of the groups and funnel them to the candidates and parties. The Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1974 introduced limits on the size of PAC gifts, but since the early 
1980s, SIGs have developed new methods for circumventing the limitations on their giving to 
candidates and parties. So called ‘soft money’ has been introduced, and thereby national 
parties can raise unlimited amounts from SIGs and redistribute the proceeds to the state party 
organizations in states where electoral needs are perceived to be great. The state organizations 
can spend the funds in a way that generally benefits the party’s congressional and presidential 
candidates as well as on overhead expenses.  
 
What do the special interest groups then buy with their hard and soft money? There is 
constant debate around this question, and three main answers can be stated. First, 
contributions have been argued to buy access – a chance for a lobbyist to meet with a 
lawmaker to present his positions. When access must be purchased, it may be because the 
legislators view their time as a scarce resource. In addition, money can play a role in 
allocating appointments if it signals to the legislator something about the value of what the 
group has to say. That is, these access costs are used by the politician to screen the lobbies. 
Often contributions are paid already before the political agenda of the parliament is known. 
This points to the fact that part of the contributions to politicians are made simply to get 
access in case important issues from the point of view of the interest group get on the table. 
 
Second, campaign contributions might also buy credibility. In many situations, a group’s 
claims may not be fully credible. A legislator may lack the means to verify a group’s claims, 
in which case the group may be tempted to exaggerate. If a group puts up money to back its 
words, it may signal to the legislator that its members indeed have strong preferences. Third, 
contributions are claimed to buy pure influence. This view has been discussed a lot in the 
media and there exists a wide pressure among voters on a campaign finance reform, 
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something that has been recently debated also in Finland. Influence can come in many stages 
in the legislative process: it may come in a speech not delivered or in an amendment not 
offered in the parliament, in the fine details of legislation, or in the form of a bill pigeon-holed 
in subcommittee. Documenting that money affects policy outcomes is however no easy task. 
It is difficult to know what a bill would have looked like or how a legislator would have voted 
in the absence of contributions.  
 
An additional remark should be made about the form of contributions since they are not 
necessarily strictly monetary. Contributions can be generally interpreted as something which 
is beneficial for the receiver and costly for the donor. Favourable policies can thus be 
implicitly exchanged for future employment, in-kind services (e.g. ‘wining and dining’, free 
rented cars, holidays etc.), volunteer labour, or even plain bribes.  
 
This study concentrates on the models with the contribution setting only and leaves aside 
studies made on the informational lobbying. Lobbying based on information transmission has 
been formalized for example by Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), Lohmann (1994 and 1998), 
and Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002). The information sharing incentives of lobbies are 
discussed in general sense also by Grossman and Helpman (2001). A recent study of 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) makes a contribution in combining the information sharing 
and contribution giving motives of interest groups.  
 
2.2  Scale of lobbying in the U.S. and in Europe 
According to European Commission estimates, Commission and European parliamentary 
officials face 20,000 lobbyists on a daily basis (European Commission, 2001). Substantial 
Europeanization of interest groups has been occurring with an estimated 1,450 interest groups 
operating at a European level instead of being active on a more local scale (Greenwood, 
2003). As the agenda-setter, the Commission is the primary focus of much of the lobbying 
activity. However, access to the Commission is generally biased towards business interests. It 
is estimated that business and professional organizations represent approximately 76 per cent 
of EU interest groups (Greenwood, 2003). Figures provided by the Parliament suggest that of 
the 5,039 accredited interest groups 70 per cent are business oriented and 20 per cent are non-
governmental organizations (European Parliament, 2003).  
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What comes to the number of SIGs in the United States,  the 2000 edition of the Encyclopedia 
of Associations listed more than 22,000 non-profit membership organizations in the U.S. that 
were national in scope. However, only about an estimated one-third of them devoted 
resources to political activities. The number of organizations cited in the 1959 edition of the 
Encyclopedia was 5,843, which suggests a significant growth in the number or organized 
interests in fifty years. Another publication, Washington Representatives, lists more than 
11,000 companies, associations, and public interest groups that engaged representatives in 
Washington, D.C. in 1999. (Grossman & Helpman, 2001, 2) 
 
At least in the European and American federal level the activities of special interest groups 
are closely regulated, and groups must register themselves officially and report systematically 
about their activity. In the U.S., lobbying expenditures and activities have been systematically 
registered for a long time, whereas in Europe, an EU level registry of special interest groups 
has been created only recently and thus far reporting has been on a voluntary basis. Currently, 
the European Commission run register of interest representatives covers 1127 pressure 
groups2 but there has been some criticism towards the accuracy of the lobbying expenses 
reported by the groups so the picture the registry gives is far from being a complete one3. Of 
the total number of registered interest representatives, 60 % are classified as in-house 
lobbyists and trade associations, of which companies represent a rough one quarter, 25 % are 
registered as non-governmental organizations and think-tanks, and the remaining 15 % are 
law firms and other organizations.  
 
To assess the influence of interest group money in politics in concrete terms, a reference can 
be made to an empirical study of Baldwin and Magee (2000) that examines voting by U.S. 
representatives on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Uruguay Round 
Agreement, and most-favoured nation status for China in the presence of lobbying 
contributions. Using political economy models of trade policy to formulate an empirical 
specification of congressional voting behaviour, they find that campaign contributions 
                                                
2
 Register accessed on March 8th, 2009. 
3
 Financial Times: “EU faces challenge over lobbying register” on Oct 31, 2008. Some groups are claimed to 
have reported imprecise lobbying expenses, and therefore stricter guidelines are welcomed by certain groups in 
order to improve the transparency of the reporting system.  
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received in the 1992 election from PACs influenced legislators’ votes on the NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round bills (which were voted on in 1994). Labour group contributions were 
associated with votes against freer trade while business contributions were associated with 
votes in favour of freer trade, which is in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin hypotheses. The main 
quantitative results that Baldwin and Magee show are that labour contributions resulted in 67 
extra votes against NAFTA and 57 extra votes against the Uruguay Round bill, while 
contributions from the business groups resulted in 41 extra votes in favour of NAFTA and 35 
extra votes for the Uruguay Round bill. This last result would suggest that NAFTA would 
have failed if business groups had made no contributions to representatives. These 
comparative statics results were obtained by running simulations with the model by setting 
either the labour or business contributions to zero. While the results of Baldwin and Magee 
offer some proof for the claim that trade policies would be on sale, it should be noted that 
their empirical model relies on many simplifying assumptions and the use of several proxy 
variables as well as mechanical simulation results.   
 
3  On the models of endogenous policy theory 
 
Endogenous policy theory is an umbrella term for a vast literature that has its roots in the 
public choice theory with foundational work by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and 
Charles Tiebout among others. Magee et al. (1989, 31) describe a policy as ‘endogenous’ if it 
can be explained by rational maximizing behaviour. A complete endogenous policy model 
has both lobbying and policies endogenous, whereas a partial endogenous policy model has 
only one of these two elements endogenous. A general equilibrium endogenous policy model 
has both politics (the parties and the lobbies) and economics (goods and factor markets) based 
on maximization by the actors.  
 
Since the 1980s, there has been an upsurge in theoretical as well as empirical economic 
studies of the behavior and political influence of interest groups. Books by Sloof (1998), 
Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) present 
surveys of theoretical studies and refer to a wealth of evidence of the significance of 
organized interests in the political arena. These surveys encourage to conclude that political 
economics has moved away from the common assumption of atomistic demand in ‘political 
markets’, such as in the median voter model, towards a more realistic framework with a 
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pluralistic view that takes into account all the actors involved. Whereas older models rely 
mainly on nonderived influence functions, the more recent literature is more explicit on the 
institutional assumptions and more uncompromising on the requirements of individual 
rationality.  
 
3.1  What constitutes a good model? 
This section goes through some typologies of political economy models. They all deal with 
endogenous trade policy, but in principle any other policy could as well be described using 
the approaches about to be introduced. The purpose of this section is to get an overview on 
models that have been constructed for endogenous policies in order to see what makes the 
Grossman-Helpman model such a distinctive contribution to the political economy literature.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, introduced in Rodrik (1995, 1459), in principle a political economy 
model of trade policy must have four elements. First, it must contain a description of 
individual preferences over the domain of policy choices available to policymakers. Given an 
underlying economic model in the form of the Hecksher-Ohlin or specific-factors framework, 
and the presumption that preferences for policy depend only on self-interest, one can deduce 
individuals’ policy rankings on the basis of their factor endowments or sector-specific skills. 
This is illustrated as box A in the figure. Second, the model must contain a description of how 
these individual preferences are aggregated and channelled, through pressure groups, political 
parties, or grass-roots movements, into “political demands” for a particular policy or another 
(box B). This step involves a characterization of the modes of political organization as well as 
of the forms that political influence takes (lobbying, campaign contributions, voter 
registration, etc.).  
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Figure 1.  Elements of a political economy model of trade (Rodrik, 1995). 
 
The next two components have to do with the “supply side” of trade policy. Here, the model 
must first characterize policymakers’ preferences (box C): do politicians make given 
decisions because they want to get re-elected, because they want to transfer resources to 
favoured groups, because they have partisan preferences, or simply because they are 
interested in maximizing social welfare? To know how these preferences play out and 
eventually interact with the demands for trade policy, the model finally has to specify the 
institutional setting in which policy takes place (box D).  
 
A satisfactory treatment of all these components is a challenging task, and none of the models 
introduced in the next section provides a truly endogenous picture. Each of them takes 
shortcuts and leaves implicit some of the elements mentioned above.  
 
3.2  The variety of models 
Rodrik (1995) distinguishes five categories for models of political economy of trade policy: 
the tariff-formation function approach, the political support function approach, the median 
voter theorem, the campaign contributions approach, and the political contributions approach. 
Within these models, the first two adopt a so called black-box approach to the modelling of 
Individual 
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government 
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endogenous trade policy, representing thus partial endogenous policy models, while the latter 
three have stronger microfoundations.  
 
3.2.1  Tariff-formation function  
Under the tariff-formation function approach, the tariff is a direct increasing function of 
resources going into lobbying in favour of the tariff and a decreasing function of lobbying 
resources devoted against it. No microfoundations are provided for the function itself. This 
approach was first used by Findlay and Wellisz (1982). A much cited article is also that of 
Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982).  
 
In its simplest version (see e.g. Rodrik, 1986), the model consists of a two-sector economy 
where one of the sectors uses only labour under constant returns to scale, while the other one, 
the politically-active sector, employs labour and sector-specific capital. As long as the first 
sector is active, the constant marginal product of labour there fixes the economy-wide wage 
(here assumed at unity). The tariff-formation function consists of a relationship of the form 
( )lt t L= , where Ll is the amount of labour used by the politically active sector in the lobbying 
process. The endogenous level of lobbying (and hence of trade protection) is given by the 
solution to the following problem:  
 max  (1 ( )),1
l
l l
L
p t L Lpi ∗ + −   (3.1) 
 
which maximizes the payoffs to the lobby group. The first term characterizes the profits 
attainable to the politically-active sector who benefits from a tariff applied over the products 
that use the sector-specific capital. The second term denotes the costs from lobbying to the 
group. This approach assumes that owners of the specific factor can perfectly coordinate their 
lobbying behaviour and costlessly prevent free riding.  
 
The model of Findlay and Wellizs (1982) has two industry lobbies in a sector-specific factors 
setting, each deciding how much labour to devote to the lobbying activity. The resulting tariff 
level is expressed as 1 2( , )l lt t L L=  with 1lL  and 2lL  standing for the amount of labour devoted to 
lobbying activities by each of the sector-specific factors. The tariff is increasing in the import-
competing industry’s lobbying, and decreasing in the other industry’s lobbying. Moreover, 
diminishing returns to lobbying are assumed. A Nash equilibrium in the two groups’ lobbying 
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strategies determines the tariff. Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) allow both labour and capital to 
be used in lobbying activities, but they focus on a case where only a single industry is 
politically active.  
 
3.2.2  Political support function  
In models using the political support function approach, the government maximizes an 
objective function where different groups in the general population are given different 
weights depending on their political importance to the incumbent government. Classical 
examples of studies based on this approach are Hillman (1982) and Van Long and Vousden 
(1991).  
 
The policymaker is assumed to be exposed to political influence from an organized interest 
group representing a particular industry, but is also assumed to take care about the efficiency 
consequences of restricting trade. The ultimate objective of the government is to secure its 
popularity among voters, in the hope of getting re-elected. The policymaker therefore 
maximizes a function which trades off the gains from protection to a given industry against 
the losses to the general population. Letting p stand for the relative price of the organized 
industry and p∗  for the relative world price, Hillman (1989) writes the government’s 
objective function to be maximized, as 
 ( ) ( ),PSW M p p p ppi pi ∗ ∗ ≡ − −  . (3.2) 
 
The first argument captures the political-support motive in favour of the industry whose profit 
function is included in the maximand, while the second represents the efficiency loss for the 
economy due to the difference between national and international price levels. Hence, the 
derivative of the first argument with respect to p is positive (when p p∗≥ ), while it is negative 
for the second argument. In the expression (4.2), both industry profits and overall welfare 
enter the political support function not in levels but in deviations from the free trade 
benchmark, .p∗  The first order condition for maximizing WPS with respect to p is given by 
 
 1 2 0pM Mpi + = . (3.3) 
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Since M1 > 0 and ppi > 0, an interior solution to this problem always requires that a positive 
level of protection is provided to the industry concerned (p > p∗ ).  
 
Van Long and Vousden (1991) provide a generalization in which political support depends 
explicitly on the income levels of different groups in a sector-specific factors economy. The 
authors distinguish between three groups in a two-good economy: owners of the specific 
factor in sector one, owners of the specific factor in sector two, and owners of the mobile 
factor, labour. Letting h = 1, 2, 3 denote representative individuals from each one of these 
groups respectively, the income of each representative individual can be described as follows: 
 
 
1 1
1 1( , ) ( )I p w p p mpi σ ∗= + −  (3.4) 
 
2 2
2 1(1, ) ( )I w p p mpi σ ∗= + −  (3.5) 
 
3 3
1( )I wL p p mσ ∗= + −  (3.6) 
 
Here good 2 is taken to be the numeraire (so that p is the relative price of good 1), and hσ  
denotes the share of each group in tariff revenue, described by 1( ) ,p p m∗− where m1 denotes 
import demand. The political support function by Van Long and Vousden then becomes 
 
 ( ) ( )PS h hh h
h h
W a V p I V p a I= =∑ ∑ɶ  (3.7) 
 
where ah are exogenous weights reflecting the politician’s preferences over the three groups. 
( ) hV p I  represents each group’s (or representative individual’s) indirect utility function.  
 
3.2.3  Median voter  
Since Anthony Downs (1957), political scientists have used a simple model of competition 
among political parties to show how the preferences of voters might be reflected in actual 
policies. The model starts by supposing that there are two competing parties, both ready to 
promise whatever will enable it to win the next election. The policy to decide on is one-
dimensional, such as the level of tariff rate. Voters, for their part, are supposed to differ in the 
policies they prefer. All the voters can then be thought of being put in a line in the order of the 
tariff rate they prefer. The two parties want to find the middle ground, and both will tend to 
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converge on the tariff rate preferred by the median voter. The median voter model of electoral 
competition has been helpful as a way of thinking about how political decisions are made in 
the real world, where the effects of a policy on income distribution may be more important 
than their effects on efficiency.  
  
The median voter approach in trade policy determination was pioneered by Mayer (1984), 
who considered a direct-democracy model where the tariff level is determined by voting 
among the population. Using a Heckscher-Ohlin model, Mayer showed that each factor owner 
has an optimal tariff rate whose value is uniquely determined by the individual’s factor 
ownership. The exportable, i.e. good 2, is set as numeraire with 2 2 1p p
∗
= =  and 
1 1 (1 ) (1 ).p p p t p t∗ ∗= = + = +  Assuming that tariff revenue is distributed in proportion to each 
person’s share in factor income, individual h’s optimal tariff rate is found by maximizing his  
indirect utility function ( ) hV p I  with respect to p. This yields: 
 
 
1
/
/
h
h
h
I p
t
p m p
φ
φ∗
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
 (3.8) 
 
where I is aggregate income, hφ  is individual h’s share in aggregate income, and 1 /m p∂ ∂ < 0, 
i.e. imports decrease as the price of the imported good increases. In the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, /h pφ∂ ∂ > 0 if individual h is relatively well-endowed in the factor that is used 
intensively in the importable, and the strength of the effect is larger the more ‘specialized’ the 
individual is in that factor. Consequently, such an individual’s most preferred tariff will be 
strictly positive. Moreover, the more open the economy to imports and the more price 
sensitive the import demand, the lower the individually desirable tariff (or export subsidy).  
 
As long as voters differ only along a single dimension (such as in their relative capital-labour 
endowment), the median-voter theorem can be applied to determine the tariff rate that would 
emerge from voting. If there are no costs to voting, the median eligible voter’s decision is the 
outcome of majority voting. Therefore, under majority voting the endogenous level of trade 
policy is determined as if a policymaker maximized the utility of the median voter denoted by 
 ( )MV mW V p I= , (3.9) 
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with m referring to the median individual. Mayer (1984) also considers the specific-factors 
case, to show that if there are costs from voting, a small industry is likely to gain protection 
because other interests may find voting against the proposed tariff increase not worthwhile. 
 
3.2.4  Campaign contributions  
In the models mentioned so far, the transfer of resources from special interest groups to 
politicians does not play any direct role. Models by Magee, Brock, and Young (1989, chs. 3 
and 9) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) have explicitly addressed the role of monetary 
contributions. In Magee et al., lobbies make contributions to increase the probability that their 
favoured political party wins the election. In Grossman and Helpman, as summarized in the 
next section, campaign contributions are made to influence the policy stance of the incumbent 
government.  
 
Magee et al. (1989) add two political parties and two lobbies to the standard  Heckscher-Ohlin 
model with two goods and two factors. One of the parties is assumed to be pro-trade, while 
the other is pro-protection. Each lobby represents one factor of production (capital or labour), 
and makes contributions to one of the two parties. More precisely, in line with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, the economy’s scarce factor organizes the protectionist lobby, and the 
economy’s abundant factor organizes the pro-trade lobby. Each party’s election probability is 
increasing in the campaign contributions it receives but decreasing in the level of the policy 
intervention it commits itself to.  
 
Formally, good 1 is assumed to be capital-intensive and a parameter q measures the 
probability that the pro-capital party is elected. Denoting by CK and CL the campaign 
contributions made respectively by the capitalist lobby to the pro-capital party and by the 
labour lobby to the pro-labour party, q is expressed as 1 1 2 2( , , , ).K Lq C C p p p p∗ ∗− −  The pro-
capital party selects p1 to maximize ( ),q ⋅  while the pro-labour party selects p2 to maximize 
1 ( ).q− ⋅  By definition, ( )q ⋅ is increasing in own received contributions and in the pro-labour 
distortion 2 2( )p p∗− , and decreasing in the contributions received by the other party and in the 
pro-capital distortion 1 1( ).p p∗−  As for lobbies, they maximize the expected incomes of the 
factors they represent, net of campaign contributions. Letting { },K Kr w represent the factor 
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returns when the pro-capital party is in power and { },L Lr w the factor returns when the pro-
labour party is in power, the objective functions for both lobbies are given by 
 
 [ ]max (1 )
K
K L KC
qr q r K C+ − −  (3.10) 
 [ ]max (1 )
L
K L LC
qw q w L C+ − −  (3.11) 
 
The assumed strategic interactions are as follows: the two parties play Nash against each 
other, as do the two lobbies. It is further assumed that the game is played in two stages where 
the parties select their policies in the first stage and the lobbies offer their contributions in the 
second. The implication is that lobbies’ contributions are intended to affect the election 
outcomes but not party platforms. The equilibrium policy is a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium to this two-stage game. The model generates equilibrium levels of p1 and p2, i.e. 
an import tariff and an export subsidy. The model describes how policies are borne out as a 
result of electoral competition.  
 
3.2.5  Political contributions  
In the political contribution models, policies are determined through monetary contributions 
by lobbies to incumbent politicians. The most renowned model in this category is that of Gene 
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994). The model is summarized here but a more detailed 
presentation is provided in chapter five.  
 
The Grossman-Helpman model deals with a single incumbent government (or a representative 
politician) that maximizes a weighted sum of total monetary contributions and aggregate 
welfare: 
 ( ) ( )i
i L
G C aW
∈
= +∑ p p  (3.12) 
 
where a (> 0) is the relative weight placed on aggregate welfare, and ( )iC p  represent the 
contributions. The underlying economic model is that of a small open economy, where the 
wage is fixed to unity due to the presence of a numeraire sector which uses labour alone. 
There exist n additional sectors which use labour plus a specific factor. Some of these specific 
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factors are represented by lobby groups. Each lobby approaches the incumbent politician with 
a contribution schedule that links any chosen policy vector to a pre-defined contribution level.  
 
Each lobby i wants to maximize its membership’s utility. Lobby i’s problem thus consists of 
selecting contribution schedules in order to maximize the joint net welfare of its members. By 
the definition of the timing of the game, and contrary to the model by Magee et al. (1989), 
lobbies are assumed to commit to their contributions before policies are selected. The 
incumbent government takes the contribution schedules as given and maximizes G 
accordingly.  
 
Equilibrium consists of a vector of domestic prices which maximizes G, plus a set of 
contribution functions { }( )iC p  such that each of these maximizes the joint welfare of the 
lobby’s membership, given the schedules of other lobbies, and the anticipated decision rule of 
the government. Grossman and Helpman rely on results from Bernheim and Whinston’s 
(1986) work on common agency to show that the protection received by a sector is higher 
when it is organized, when its output is high relative to competing imports, and when the 
price elasticity of the competing imports is low.  
 
3.3   Comparison of the models 
The purpose of this section is to provide a summary of the previous five modelling types in 
order to see how they compare to each other with regard to the four model elements defined 
by Rodrik (1995). The table below (Table 1) describes each of the modelling approaches by 
the elements it contains. As is clear from the table, two of the five models cover all four 
elements at least at some depth. The median voter model, however, does not consider 
lobbying in the first place, so it cannot be accused of not giving explicit treatment to the 
actions of lobby groups.  
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 Individual 
preferences (A) 
Interest group’s 
actions (B) 
Policymaker’s 
preferences (C) 
Institutional structure 
of government (D) 
 
Tariff formation •  •  
  
 
Political support 
  •  •  
 
Median voter •  
 •  •  
Campaign 
contributions •  •  •  •  
Political 
contributions •  •  •  •  
Table 1. Summary of the modelling typologies 
 
The two first models, the tariff-formation function and the political support function, offer 
only a partial view of the whole political field by treating either the political demand side or 
the political supply side as a black box. The tariff-function approach, while quite popular, 
leaves aside the supply side of protection as the preferences of the politician are not explicitly 
stated. The political support function can be viewed as the mirror image of the tariff-
formation function approach because it makes explicit the objective function of the 
policymakers while leaving implicit the actions taken by pressure groups to extract the 
desired behaviour from them. What these black boxes translate to, however, is more 
simplicity in the use of the models. 
 
The median voter model is exemplary in that it is a fully-specified political economy model, 
with no black boxes among the three elements that the model actually treats. The assumption 
of direct democracy greatly simplifies the institutional setting but is however an abstraction 
from reality: in practice, trade policy, or any other policy, is rarely determined by majority 
voting. The model is in fact no interest group model because the policy outcome is based on 
the median individual’s preferred tariff rate which is not subject to lobbying. Therefore, the 
term lobbying model, used sometimes in this study, refers actually only to the four other 
typologies introduced. The median voter framework is however widely used in literature of 
political economy.  
 
The campaign contributions model of Magee et al. fulfils the criteria of a general equilibrium 
endogenous policy model defined by the authors themselves. It includes both the political and 
economic side of a country, taking thus together politicians (or parties), lobbies, goods, and 
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factors of production.  The campaign contributions model is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework whereas the political contributions model of Grossman and Helpman builds on the 
Ricardo-Viner specific-factors model. The two frameworks produce different individual 
preferences on trade policy; in Heckscher-Ohlin models, factors evaluate trade policy based 
on their factor type while in Ricardo-Viner models, factors evaluate trade policy based on 
their industry of employment. There has been some research that has tried to shed some light 
on the question of which of these frameworks is more appropriate (see e.g. Scheve & 
Slaughter, 2001).  
 
In the theoretical modelling of endogenous protection in general sense, the Grossman-
Helpman model is the biggest advance as it provides strong microfoundations to the 
behaviour of both lobbies and the government. In addition, the Grossman-Helpman model is 
multisectoral so it allows a rather general analysis of the theme. On the other hand, the model 
is subject for instance to the criticism that only a small part of lobbying activity in real politics 
takes the form of financial contributions.  
  
3.4   Logic of collective action  
Lobby groups are not single entities, but rather consist of individuals who contribute to the 
group’s activities. This is of importance, because the benefit of lobbying has the characteristic 
of a public good if the induced policy change through lobbying affects all individuals in a 
society and if it is not possible to exclude anybody from it. As is common in the provision of 
public goods, incentives to free-ride among lobby members, or between interest groups that 
share the same political preferences, may result and make any joint action difficult. Mancur 
Olson (1965) is renowned for having studied in a broad sense the free-rider dilemma and the 
dynamics of interest group formation. As Olson puts it, while it is in the interests of the group 
as a whole to press for favourable policies, it is not in any individual’s interest to do so.  
 
In his book The Logic of Collective Action, Olson discusses the purposes and chances of 
organizations to get themselves organized in order to produce some public good for their 
members. His work is mainly structured around two broad questions: what makes collective 
action possible, and what is the relationship between group size and the effectiveness of the 
group? He concludes that rational, self-interested individuals will not act voluntarily to 
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achieve their common or group interests. The reason for this claim is that when interests are 
shared, rational actors should prefer to free-ride and let others pay the cost of goods that will 
benefit everyone. If, nevertheless, we see groups acting to further their interests, this is 
possible to the extent that collective action is accompanied by private incentives to reward 
contributors or to punish non-contributors.  
 
As for the second question, Olson’s conclusion is that group size is inversely related to 
successful collective action, while in the case of small groups the collective good is provided, 
but at a suboptimal level. The reason for this lies in the notion that the collective good is 
likely to be provided by the individual in the group for whom the personal gain is the largest. 
The collective good is provided at the level that this largest actor is willing and able to pay 
for. Then, once the member with the largest obtainable gain has secured the amount he wants, 
no one has an incentive to provide any more of the collective good (Olson, 1965, 29). The 
larger the group the smaller the capacity of one actor to cover the costs, and therefore the 
larger the suboptimality. If the size of the group exceeds a given threshold, no member, no 
matter how large, will be able to provide any quantity of the collective good.  
 
The problem of collective action can explain why policies that seem to both produce more 
costs than benefits and hurt more voters than they help can nevertheless be adopted. This 
happens when the advocates of the policy are a small group that is able to mobilize itself and 
be well aware of the consequences of the policy to its members. At the same time the 
opposing side may consist of a huge population that does not even perceive itself as an 
interest group. Consumer groups are often underrepresented in the political arena, perhaps due 
to the difficulty of forming an efficient interest group.    
 
There is a wide body of literature deriving from the themes laid out by Olson. There have 
been various attempts, both theoretical and empirical, to find support for Olson’s ideas, but 
the results remain mixed for instance on the impact of firm concentration on the protection 
benefited by an industry (e.g. Pecorino (1998), Esteban and Ray (2001), Magee (2002), 
Hansen et al. (2005)). Following Olson’s reasoning, more concentrated industries should gain 
more tariff protection while larger sectors with less concentration should have problems in 
maintaining cooperation in the lobbying process.  
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Even though the scope of this study does not allow for a more detailed look at this literature, 
it is certainly relevant to the modelling of the political game between interest groups and 
politicians. An adequate handling of the questions related to the organizing capabilities of 
different industries may enrich and improve the existing models. However, modelling the 
endogenous formation of interest groups is problematic and in most models the free-rider 
challenge is kept aside by relying on an assumption that an exogenously given part of the 
citizens are able to overcome the incentive to free-ride and thus manage to build up an interest 
group while the rest of the people stay unorganized. If all citizens were represented by interest 
groups then the different lobbies would offset each other’s objectives, and the political results 
would be the same as if there were no lobbies at all (this is discussed for instance in Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994). The Grossman-Helpman model does not address the issue of collective 
action, something which is subject to improvements in subsequent studies. Mitra (1999) 
renders the formation of lobby groups endogenous in trade policy setting, Damania and 
Fredriksson (2003) do it in environmental policy setting, and Laussel (2006) builds on a 
model treating the provision of public goods. 
 
4   Common agency, menu auctions and Protection for Sale 
Grossman and Helpman built their Protection for Sale article (1994), which studies the trade 
policy formation in a common agency framework, on the foundations of Bernheim and 
Whinston’s earlier work on common agency and menu auctions. This chapter introduces both 
of these integral models, because they represent the stone base of this study and allow us to 
look in later chapters at models that go beyond these ‘basic’ models as I henceforth intend to 
call them.  
 
4.1  Common agency framework 
The endogenous protection model of Grossman and Helpman that will be presented in the 
next section is an application of a menu auction game in which principals introduce the agent 
a menu of offers for various possible actions that the agent can make. The theoretical 
foundations for menu auctions in a common agency framework are laid out by Douglas 
Bernheim and Michael Whinston in a paper published in 1986. This section offers a rough 
introduction to the common agency and menu auctions framework. Bernheim and Whinston 
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already proposed to use their model in political economy settings, something which Grossman 
and Helpman did a bit later in a formal manner in their Protection for Sale article. Being 
familiar with the idea of menu auctions helps in understanding the steps taken in the 
Grossman-Helpman model. 
 
In the auction model that Bernheim and Whinston introduce, the auctioned object is not well-
defined and indivisible. They give an example of a large government construction project 
which can be composed of several distinct component contracts, and the bidders can submit 
offers on more than one component and may condition offers upon the set of contracts 
received. The authors focus on first-price menu auctions under complete information, and 
they show that the auctions always result in an efficient action. ‘First-price’ refers to the 
characteristic of the model that each bidder (principal) pays the agent the amount announced 
for the action chosen in his or her menu. The agent makes the choice in order to maximize his 
own payoff given the menus of offers that the bidders have named. Bidders are assumed to 
have complete information on each other and on the actions and their economic consequences 
which is a restrictive but simplifying assumption. 
 
As to the allocational efficiency of the menu auction game, in first-price complete information 
auctions of a single indivisible object, it entails no complex thinking: equilibrium requires that 
the auctioneer sell the good to the individual who values it most highly. The Nash Equilibria 
of first-price menu auctions, for their part, need not be efficient in general. Bernheim and 
Whinston solve the problem by introducing “truthful equilibria”, a subset of the Nash 
Equilibria set, which ensure that the menu auctions are always efficient. In a truthful 
equilibrium, the bids of all principals correctly reflect their relative preferences for the various 
alternative actions. Bernheim and Whinston prove that the best response set of every principal 
always contains a truthful strategy so they are not costly for principals to use. Moreover, the 
truthful Nash equilibria are the only equilibria which are coalition-proof, i.e., stable when 
nonbinding communication between the principals is possible. 
 
4.1.1  The model 
The model is based on a game in which an auctioneer (the agent) selects an action affecting 
the wellbeing of M bidders (principals), each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent 
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on the action chosen by the agent. For ease of exposition, the following presentation and 
notation of the model is based on a discussion by Laussel and LeBreton (2001).  
 
Let us denote the set of principals by { }1,....,N n= . The agent will be identified by the index 
0. The possible choices of the agent are given by a set A. Principal i receives gross monetary 
payoffs described by the function :iv A → ℝ while the function :ov A → ℝ  indicates the 
utility (or disutility) in monetary units that the agent experiences in taking each possible 
action. Let us denote by 2N  the set of subsets of N including the empty set. A common 
agency game is then completely described by an ( )2n +  tuple { }0 1, , ,..., nA v v vΓ ≡ .  
 
A strategy for each principal i consists of a function : ,ic A +→ ℝ  that is, the principal offers 
the agent a monetary reward of ( )ic a  for selecting action a. For each action a, the principal 
gets a net payoff given by the function in  with  
 
( ) ( ) ( )i i in a v a c a= − . (4.1) 
The agent chooses an action that maximizes her total payoff, i.e., given monetary rewards 
( )1,..., nc c c≡  the agent selects an action in the set M(c) with 
 0( ) arg max ( ) ( ) .i
a A i N
M c c a v a
∈ ∈
 
≡ + 
 
∑  (4.2) 
 
For all subsets 2NS ∈ ,  0( ) max ( ) ( )i
a A i S
W S v a v aΓ
∈
∈
 
= + 
 
∑  is the highest joint payoff for the 
agent and principals in group S and 0( ) arg max ( ) ( )i
a A i S
A S v a v a∗Γ
∈ ∈
 
= + 
 
∑  is the set of actions 
that yield this payoff.  
 
An outcome of the game is an (n + 1) tuple ( , )c a∗ ∗
 
with 1( ,..., ).nc c c∗ ∗ ∗≡  An outcome is a 
Nash equilibrium if ( )a M c∗ ∗∈
 
and there is no ,  :  and ( , )i i ii N c A a M c c∗+ −∈ → ∈ℝ  such 
that ( ) ( )i in a n a∗≻ . In other words, the efficient equilibrium action maximizes the joint payoff 
of the agent and all the principals so that no principal attains a higher payoff by altering his 
contribution schedule given the schedules of others.  
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4.1.2  Truthful equilibria 
The model described has two stages and it is solved using backward induction starting from 
the decision of the agent. This may result into multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria, that 
is, equilibria where the contribution schedule of each interest group is a best response to the 
set of schedules of the other groups, when all groups correctly anticipate the policymaker’s 
best response. Some of these can be inefficient. Bernheim and Whinston have therefore 
developed a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that selects equilibria that implement 
Pareto-efficient actions. Bernheim and Whinston have considered equilibria that arise when 
each principal offers the agent a payment function that is truthful. A truthful payment function 
for principal i rewards the agent for every change in the action exactly the amount of change 
in the principal’s welfare, provided that the payment both before and after the change is 
strictly positive. In other words, the shape of the payment schedule mirrors the shape of the 
principal’s indifference surface. In such a case, the principal gets the same utility for all 
actions a that induce positive payments ( )iC a > 0; the payment is just the compensating 
variation.  
 
The authors show that the common agency game has a truthful equilibrium in which all the 
principals follow truthful strategies and that such an equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. By the 
definition of Pareto-efficiency, the outcome is thus such that neither the policymaker nor any 
SIG could be made better off by a different policy choice or a different set of contribution 
levels without another SIG or the policymaker being harmed. 
 
Grossman and Helpman (2001) speak of truthful contributions as compensating contribution 
functions. The term ‘compensating’ derives from the fact that when the SIG makes positive 
offers for two different levels of the policy, the difference between the two offers 
compensates for the difference in the SIG’s evaluation of the two policies. In other words, if 
C(a) is a compensating function with 1 1( )  > 0C a c=  and 2 2( )  > 0C a c=  for some 1 2 and ,a a  
then 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , ).U a c U a c=  The term ‘compensating’ reflects the relationship between the 
contribution functions and the economic concept of Hicksian compensating variation, which 
again refers to the amount an agent must be paid (or taxed) in a new situation to leave him 
exactly as well off as he was in an initial situation (Grossman & Helpman, 2001, 232). 
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Bernheim and Whinston further proof that a SIG (having quasi-linear preferences) can always 
design a truthful payment schedule to achieve its political objectives at no extra cost to itself. 
Thus, the SIG’s best response always includes a truthful strategy. Dixit, Grossman and 
Helpman (1997) have extended this formal proof to more general preferences. 
 
One general feature of the basic common agency model as introduced by Bernheim and 
Whinston is that it is practically a game between the principals. The strategic role of the agent 
is very small and the actual battle is done among the principals when drafting their 
contribution schedules. As shown, under truthful strategies the agent will eventually choose 
the action leading to the efficient equilibrium. This feature is somewhat changed when the 
agent is given more power, for example through the ability to set the agenda which is 
discussed in chapter five.  
 
4.2  The Grossman-Helpman model 
This section provides a thorough presentation of the Grossman-Helpman model in order to 
study its mechanics and find debatable issues that will then be picked up in later chapters.  
 
Individuals 
Let us start from a small economy that is populated by individuals with identical preferences 
but different factor endowments. Each individual maximizes a quasilinear utility function 
given by  
 0 ( )i iu x u x= +∑  (4.3) 
  
where 0x  is consumption of good 0 and ix  is consumption of good i, 1, 2,...,i n= . The sub-
utility functions ( )iu ⋅
 
are differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. Good 0 serves as 
numeraire, with a world and domestic price equal to 1. Let us denote by ip
∗
 the exogenous 
world price of good i, while ip  represents its domestic price. With these preferences, an 
individual spending an amount E consumes ( )i i ix d p=
 
of good i, 1,2,...,i n=  (where the 
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demand function of ( )id ⋅  is the inverse of ( )iu x′ )4, and 0 ( )i i ix E p d p= −∑ of the numeraire 
good. By plugging these back into the utility function one gets the indirect utility of the form: 
 
 ( , ) ( )V E E s= +p p  (4.4)  
   
where 1 2( , ,..., )np p p=p  is the vector of domestic prices of the nonnumeraire goods and 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i is u d p p d p= −∑ ∑p  is the consumer surplus derived from those goods. 
 
Production 
Good 0 is manufactured from labour alone with constant returns to scale and an input-output 
coefficient equal to 1. The aggregate supply of labour is assumed to be enough to ensure a 
positive supply of this good. In a competitive equilibrium (with MC p= ) the wage rate then 
equals 1. Production of each nonnumeraire good requires labour and a sector-specific input. 
The technologies for these goods exhibit constant returns to scale, and the various specific 
inputs are available in inelastic supply. With the wage rate fixed at 1, the aggregate reward to 
the specific factor used in the production of good i depends only on the domestic price of that 
good. This reward is denoted by ( )i ippi . 
  
Political activity of individuals 
A typical individual derives income from wages and government transfers, and possibly from 
the ownership of some sector-specific input. It is assumed that claims to the specific inputs 
are indivisible and nontradable, and that individuals own at most one type. Those who own 
some of the specific input used in producing good i will see their income tied to the domestic 
price of that good. These individuals, in addition to their general interest as consumers in 
trade policies that affect any domestic prices, will then have a direct stake in the tax or 
subsidy applicable to trade in good i. 
  
The various owners of the specific factor used in industry i, with their common interest in 
protection (or export subsidies) for their sector, may choose to join forces for political 
activity. It is simply assumed that in some exogenous set of sectors, denoted L, the specific-
                                                
4
 From the maximization of the quasilinear utility function we get the inverse demand function ( ) ( )p x u x′= . 
The demand function ( ) (= ( ))x p d p  is then the inverse of ( ).u x′  
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factor owners have been able to organize themselves into lobby groups. The lobbies serve to 
coordinate campaign giving decisions and to communicate the political rewards to the 
government. In the remaining sectors, if any, the individual owners of the specific factors 
remain unorganized. Any individual perceives himself as too small to communicate political 
demands effectively or to influence policy. Therefore, the unorganized factor owners, as well 
as all individuals who own no claims to a specific input, refrain from making political 
contributions. 
  
The lobby representing an organized sector i makes its political contribution contingent on the 
trade policy vector implemented by the government. Since the country is small, it can 
equivalently relate the contribution to the realized vector of domestic prices instead of 
political actions, a, in the Bernheim and Whinston model in the previous section. Let us 
denote by ( )iC p  the contribution schedule tendered by lobby i. The lobby tailors the schedule 
to maximize the total welfare (income plus consumer surplus less contributions) of its 
members. It then collects the necessary donations from its members in such a way as to allow 
all to share in the gains from political coordination. It will prove convenient in what follows 
to express the joint welfare of the members of lobby group i as i i iV W C= − , where iW  is their 
gross of contributions joint welfare. We note that 
 
 [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iW p N r spi α= + + +p p pℓ  (4.5) 
 
where iℓ  is the total labour supply (and also the labour income) of owners of the specific 
input used in industry i and iα  is the fraction of the voting population that owns some of this 
factor.  
 
Policy instruments 
The set of policy instruments available for politicians is restricted in this model; the 
government is allowed to implement only trade taxes and subsidies. These policies drive a 
gap between domestic and world prices. A domestic price in excess of the world price implies 
an import tariff for a good that is imported and an export subsidy for one that is exported. 
Domestic prices below world prices correspond analogously to import subsidies and export 
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taxes. The net revenue from all taxes and subsidies, expressed on a per capita basis, is given 
by  
 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ir p p d p y pN
∗  
= − −  
∑p  (4.6) 
 
where N measures the total (voting) population and ( ) ( )i i i iy p ppi ′=  is domestic output of 
good i. It is assumed that the government redistributes revenue uniformly to all of the 
country’s voters. Then r(p) gives the net government transfer to each individual.  
 
The government 
The incumbent government cares about the total level of political contributions and about 
aggregate wellbeing. The government values contributions, because they can be used to 
finance campaign spending, and they may provide other direct benefits to the officeholders. 
Social welfare will be of concern to the incumbent government if voters are more likely to re-
elect a government that has delivered a high standard of living. The utility function is meant 
to capture the policymaker’s personal preferences over the various possible policy outcomes, 
as well as her concern for her future electoral prospects. The policy chosen will affect the 
politician’s chances of being re-elected if voters look retrospectively at her record when 
deciding whether to vote for her in subsequent elections. The utility function ( )G ⋅  is assumed 
to be increasing in contributions; this reflects an assumption that the politician can use any 
funds she receives from the interest group to finance campaign spending or otherwise 
purchase political gain. The government’s objective function is presented by the following 
linear form, 
 ( ) ( )i
i L
G C aW
∈
= +∑ p p      0a ≥  (4.7) 
 
where W represents aggregate, gross-of-contributions welfare5. Aggregate gross welfare 
equals aggregate private income plus trade tax revenues plus total consumer surplus; that is, 
 
                                                
5
 The government’s welfare function could also be written as 1 2 ( )
i L i L
i i iG a C a W C
∈ ∈
= + −∑ ∑ɶ , where 2a  is the 
weight the government attaches to net aggregate welfare. Maximizing Gɶ  is equivalent to maximizing G with 
2 1 2/ ( )a a a a= − , provided that 1 2 > a a . It is assumed that this is the case, i.e. that politicians value a dollar in 
their campaign coffers more than a dollar in the hands of the public. Whether this is a correct assumption can be 
questioned.  
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 [ ]
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i
i
W p N r spi
=
= + + +∑p p pℓ . (4.8) 
 
 
The centre of interest, here, is the political equilibrium of a two-stage non-cooperative game 
in which the lobbies simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules in the first 
stage and the government sets policy in the second. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a 
domestic price vector p  that maximizes the governments objective taking the contribution 
schedules as given, and a set of contribution functions { }( )iC p , one for each organized lobby 
group, such that each one maximizes the joint welfare of the group’s members given the 
schedules set by the other groups and the anticipated political optimization by the 
government. The equilibrium structure of protection is characterized in the next section, and 
the lobbies’ political contributions that induce the policy choice of the government in the 
section that follows. 
 
4.2.1  The structure of protection  
As noted earlier, in this economy the interaction between the various lobbies and the 
government has the structure of a menu-auction problem. Bernheim and Whinston limited 
their analysis to situations where players bid for a finite set of objects, but their main results 
apply also when the auctioneer can choose from a continuum of possible actions, such as the 
level of tariffs and subsidies in the model at hand. Accordingly, the government’s choice set 
of domestic price vectors is allowed here to be continuous. 
  
Let us denote by P the set of domestic price vectors from which the government may choose. 
P is bound so that each domestic price ip  must lie between some minimum ip  and some 
maximum ip . Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston implies that equilibrium to the trade-
policy game can be characterized as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 (B-W):   { }( )iC p  is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the trade policy 
game if and only if: 
(a) iC   is feasible for all i ∈  L; 
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(b) p  maximizes ( ) ( )i
i L
C aW
∈
+∑ p p  on P; 
(c) p  maximizes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j i
i L
W C C aW
∈
− + +∑p p p p   on P for every j L∈ ; 
(d) for every j L∈  there exists a j P∈p  that maximizes ( ) ( )i
i L
C aW
∈
+∑ p p  on 
P such that ( ) 0jjC =p . 
 
Condition (a) restricts each lobby’s contribution schedule to be among those that are feasible 
i.e., contributions must be nonnegative and no greater than the aggregate income available to 
the lobby’s members. Condition (b) states that, given the contribution schedules offered by 
the lobbies, the government sets trade policy to maximize its own welfare. 
  
Condition (c) stipulates that, for every lobby j, the equilibrium price vector must maximize 
the joint welfare of that lobby and the government, given the contribution schedules offered 
by the other lobbies. If this were not the case, then lobby j could reformulate its policy bids to 
induce the government to choose the jointly optimal price vector and could appropriate some 
of the surplus from the switch in policy.  
 
Condition (d) requires that for every lobby group  j there must exist a policy other than p  
that elicits a contribution of zero from group j and which the government finds equally 
attractive as the equilibrium policy p . This feature is related to the discussion of equilibrium 
contribution schedules offered by lobbies to induce the government to choose the policy most 
favourable to the given lobby. This topic is taken up in the next section.  
  
Let us assume now that the lobbies set political-contribution functions that are differentiable, 
at least around the equilibrium point p . With contribution functions that are differentiable, 
the fact that p  maximizes jV G+  implies that  the following first-order condition is satisfied: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0j j i
i L
W C C W
a
∈
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− + + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑
p p p p
p p p p
      
   
  for all .j L∈  (4.9) 
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However, the government’s maximization of G requires the first-order condition 
 
 
( ) ( ) 0.i
i L
C W
a
∈
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂∑
p p
p p
  
 
 (4.10) 
  
Taken together, (4.9) and (4.10) imply 
  
 
( ) ( )
 for all .i iC W i L∂ ∂= ∈
∂ ∂
p p
p p
   
 
 (4.11) 
 
Equation (4.11) establishes that the contribution schedules are locally truthful around p ; that 
is, each lobby sets its contribution schedule so that the marginal change in the contribution for 
a small change in policy matches the effect of the policy change on the lobby’s welfare. This 
notion of truthfulness can be extended to define globally truthful contribution schedules 
which eventually imply the government to choose p such that it maximizes the joint welfare 
of the represented industries and the government. 
  
The next step is then to characterize the equilibrium trade policies that can be supported by 
differentiable contribution schedules.  Summing (4.11) over i and substituting the result into 
(4.10) gives  
 
( ) ( ) 0.i
i L
W W
a
∈
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂∑
p p
p p
  
 
 (4.12) 
 
This equation characterizes the equilibrium domestic prices supported by differentiable 
contribution functions. To get the policy outcome, it is necessary to calculate both of the 
terms in (4.12). They can be obtained by using the previously given definitions and 
expressions. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) can be combined and differentiated then with respect to 
pj to find how marginal policy changes affect the welfare of some lobby i. The resulting 
expression is then summed over all i L∈  to derive the first term in equation (4.12). The 
second term is obtained by making use of the definition of W in (4.8) and differentiating the 
resulting expression with respect to pj. Substituting the two expressions obtained into (4.12) 
allows us to solve for the domestic prices in political equilibrium, assuming that these prices 
lie in the interior of P. The result is expressed in terms of the equilibrium ad valorem trade 
taxes and subsidies, which are defined by ( ) /i i i it p p p∗ ∗≡ −  . 
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PROPOSITION 2 (Equilibrium policies): If the lobbies use contribution schedules that are 
differentiable around the equilibrium point, and if the equilibrium lies in the interior of P, 
then the government chooses trade taxes and subsidies that satisfy 
 
 
1
i i L i
i L i
t I z
t a e
α
α
 
−
=  
+ +  
 
 
  for 1,2,...,i n=  (4.13)  
 
where ( ) / ( )i i i i iz y p m p=    is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports (negative for 
exports since exports correspond to negative imports) and ( ) / ( )i i i i i ie m p p m p′= −     is the 
elasticity of import demand or of export supply (the former defined to be positive, the latter 
negative).  
  
Proposition 2 implies that, all else equal, industries that have high import demand or export 
supply elasticities (in absolute value) will have smaller ad valorem deviations from free trade. 
This is true for two reasons. First, the government may bear a political cost from creating 
deadweight loss (if a > 0). To the extent that this is so, it will prefer to raise contributions 
from sectors where the cost is small. Second, even if a = 0, if Lα  > 0 the members of lobbies 
as a group will share in any deadweight loss that results from trade policy. The owners of 
specific inputs in industries other than i will bid more to avoid protection in sector i the 
greater is the social cost of that protection.  
  
Equation (4.13) implies that all sectors that are represented by lobbies are protected by import 
tariffs or export subsidies in the political equilibrium. In contrast, import subsidies or export 
taxes are applied to all sectors that have no organized representation. In other words, the 
organized interest groups collectively manage to raise the domestic prices of goods from 
which they derive profit income and to lower the prices of goods that they only consume. The 
political power of a particular organized sector is reflected by the ratio of domestic output to 
imports. In sectors with a large domestic output, the specific-factor owners have much to gain 
from an increase in the domestic price, while the economy has relatively little to lose from 
protection when the volume of imports is low with a given import demand elasticity.  
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The smaller is the weight that the government places on a dollar of aggregate welfare 
compared with a dollar of campaign financing, the larger in absolute value are all trade taxes 
and subsidies. An interior solution remains possible, however, even if the government cares 
only about contributions (so a = 0). This is because the interest groups themselves do not 
want the distortions to grow too large. As the share of voters who are members of one interest 
group or another increases, equilibrium rates of protection for the organized industries 
decline. At the extreme, when all voters belong to an interest group (so 1Lα = ) and all sectors 
are represented (so 1iI =  for all i), then free trade prevails in all markets. In this case, the 
various interest groups neutralize one another, so that an industry’s demand for protection is 
matched in equilibrium by the opposing interest groups’ bids for a low domestic price. On the 
other hand, if interest-group members comprise a negligible fraction of the voting population 
(so 0Lα = ), then no trade taxes or subsidies will be applied to a good not represented by a 
lobby (for which 0iI = ). The intuition behind this is that when the potential political 
contributors are few in number, they stand little to gain from trade interventions in sectors 
other than their own.  
 
4.2.2  Political contributions 
The previous section characterized the structure of protection that emerges from the political 
process whenever the interest groups use contribution schedules that are locally differentiable. 
This restriction on the contribution functions leaves latitude for schedules with many different 
shapes, and in fact the set of contribution schedules that supports the equilibrium policy 
vector is not unique. Different sets of equilibrium contribution schedules give rise to different 
equilibrium transfers by the various lobby groups and thus to different net payoffs for the 
groups’ members. It is therefore interesting to take a look at the determination of equilibrium 
contributions in different political settings.  
  
Grossman and Helpman limit their focus from this point on only to truthful Nash equilibria. 
With this restriction, and an earlier definition of truthful contribution schedules, the 
competition between the lobbies involves only a choice of scalars { }iB which represent the 
net welfare to lobby i whenever it makes a positive contribution to the government in 
equilibrium. Given these ‘anchors’, the lobby then wishes to make iB  as large as possible and 
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the contribution as small as possible, but without going so far as to induce the government to 
deviate from p  to some alternative policy that might be damaging to its interests.  
  
Each lobby must thus worry about what policy would be chosen if it were to raise its iB  to a 
level where the government would opt to neglect its interests entirely. Grossman and 
Helpman define i−p  as the policy that would emerge from political maximization by the 
government if the contribution offered by lobby i were zero, that is,  
  
 arg max ( , ) ( ) for .i j j
P j L
j i
C B aW i L−
∈ ∈
≠
= + ∈∑
p
p p p  (4.14) 
 
Lobby i will raise its iB  to the point where the government is just indifferent between 
choosing the policy i−p  and choosing the equilibrium policy p . The following equation 
expresses this indifference: 
  
 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )T i i Tj j j j
j L j L
j i
C B aW C B aW− −
∈ ∈
≠
+ = +∑ ∑p p p p      for all .i L∈  (4.15) 
 
Grossman and Helpman introduce three cases to illustrate how the equilibrium contributions 
are determined in different situations. In the first case, only one lobby group is assumed to be 
politically active. The equilibrium policy vector in this case provides protection for sector i 
( ip > ip∗ ), and so long as iα  > 0, it calls for import subsidies and export taxes on all other 
goods ( jp < jp∗  for j i≠ ). The equilibrium campaign contribution of lobby i is found using 
(4.15), recalling that in this case i− ∗=p p , which results to ( , ) ( ) ( )Ti iC B aW aW∗= −p p p   . It 
can be seen that the lobby contributes an amount that is proportional to the excess burden that 
the equilibrium trade policies impose on society. The factor of proportionality is the weight 
that the government attaches to aggregate gross welfare in its own objective function. In this 
political equilibrium, the politicians derive exactly the same utility as they would have 
achieved by allowing free trade in a world without influence payments. Thus, a lobby that 
faces no opposition from other lobbies captures the entire surplus from its political 
relationship with the government. 
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In the second case, all of the voters are represented by lobby groups. The political competition 
in this case results in free trade. Nevertheless, each lobby must make a positive campaign 
contribution in order to induce the government to choose this outcome rather than one that 
would be still worse from its perspective. Assuming for simplicity that there were only two 
nonnumeraire goods and two lobbies, and using again (4.15), it is concluded that both lobbies 
must actively contribute to the incumbent government in order to support the free-trade 
outcome. When all voters are active in the process of buying influence, the rivalry among 
competing interests is most intense, and the government captures the entire surplus from the 
political relationships. Grossman and Helpman further show that each lobby i must contribute 
to the politicians an amount equal to the difference between what its rival and the government 
could jointly achieve were lobby i not itself active in the political process and what the two 
actually attain in the full political equilibrium.  
 
In the third case, the ownership of the specific factors is so highly concentrated that interest-
group members account for a negligible fraction of the total voting population. The political 
equilibrium in this case has positive protection for all organized sectors. But since 0iα =  for 
all i, the members of each interest group receive only a negligible share of government 
transfer payments and derive only a negligible share of the surplus from consuming 
nonnumeraire products. Thus, no lobby is willing to contribute toward trade intervention in 
any sector other than its own. The common agency problem here is the same as for a set of 
separate principal-agent arrangements between each industry lobby and the government. As in 
case 1, each lobby i must compensate the government for the political cost of providing 
protection (it pays a times the deadweight loss imposed by the industry policy ip ). But with 
no political rivalry between the special interests, each industry group captures the entire 
surplus from its own political relationship with the government.    
 
4.3  Limitations of the model 
Although the Grossman-Helpman model is widely adopted in political economy literature and 
it offers an ingenious way to characterise the policy making process, the model is far from 
being a complete picture of the reality. There has been significant progression from the 
earliest lobbying models to the Grossman-Helpman model but certain open questions still 
remain.  
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First, the policymaker can only choose from two trade policies; taxes and subsidies. In reality, 
the set of policy instruments that could be adopted or at least taken into consideration is 
richer. What comes to trade policies, quotas, production or consumption taxes and subsidies, 
or regulatory barriers would also offer a way to drive trade to a given direction if so decided. 
The authors themselves recognize this as well and include a short discussion of the 
consideration of output subsidies within the framework. The implications of the presence of 
consumption and production taxes and subsidies at the disposal of the government are worked 
out more thoroughly by Dixit (1996).  
 
In addition to being based on perfect competition in product markets, the model does not in 
this form take into account the downstream users of specific factors. In the basic model 
presented, the various industry groups oppose one another only to the extent that owners of 
specific factors also protect their interests as ordinary consumers. In reality, there are also 
numerous producers who use the specific factor as an intermediate input and who therefore 
oppose any increases in the domestic price of those factors. Whereas domestic manufacturers 
support import barriers of their final products, the users of intermediate inputs want to use 
their political power against such policies. The downstream users of specific factors can 
however be incorporated into the model, which is something that Krishna and Gawande 
(2005) have done in their empirical testing of the GH model with American data.   
 
Moreover, Grossman and Helpman do not address the question of lobby formation; which 
industry groups manage to organize themselves into effective lobbies. Their model takes the 
interest groups as exogenous – some industries are organized and some are not. They do not 
address the issue of how the utility function of the interest groups relates to the policy 
preferences of the individual members, nor do they concern themselves with the internal 
distribution of the burden for paying the contribution. Rather, they simply assume that the 
group has managed to overcome its collective action problem, and that the interest group’s 
utility function represents its internally agreed objective.  
 
What Grossman and Helpman also assume is complete information between the interest 
groups and the policymaker. It can be, however, that when making political contributions the 
interest group does not know for sure the ideology and values of the policymaker. Inclusion of 
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information asymmetry in the model might change the behaviour of interest groups or the 
policymaker and possibly also the outcome of the policy game. 
 
The government structure of the Grossman-Helpman model is very simple. The model 
assumes that there is only one policymaker (that may represent a group of policymakers) who 
decides on trade policies. In reality, no government works that way. The governmental 
structure of the European Union, for instance, is complex with the procedure between the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and with various working groups 
as well as committees working on the proposals. Thus, taking into account the hierarchical 
structure of the government would enrich the basic model.  
 
5  Amended Protection for sale   
The previous chapter covered some shortcomings of the Grossman-Helpmann model. This 
chapter provides a look at some research which is based on the idea of the original GH model 
but which tries to improve or amend it in different ways in order to make the theory better 
suitable for modelling the real world. In what follows, three such issues are addressed 
separately: endogenous lobby formation, asymmetric information, and hierarchical 
government structure. Other possible aspects are briefly presented under the last section of the 
chapter. The emphasis will be on the constructions of the models rather than on their results. 
 
5.1  Endogenous lobby formation 
This topic was referred to already in the discussion of the logic of collective action in chapter 
four. As mentioned there, many common agency models take a shortcut in the treatment of 
the organizing capabilities of industries by assuming that the share of sectors that undertake 
political activities is given as an exogenous parameter. However, the decision to become 
organized or not can be made endogenous by adding certain new ingredients into the GH 
model. Devashish Mitra’s (1999) formal handling of an endogenous lobbying model has 
gained attention and has been adopted by other theorists as well (see e.g. Krishna and Mitra 
(2005), and Magee (2002)). This section also takes a look at an alternative endogenous lobby 
model introduced by Didier Laussel (2006) which in fact follows the very same idea of fixed 
lobby formation costs as Mitra (1999).  
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5.1.1  Endogenous lobbies by Mitra 
Mitra (1999) has incorporated endogenous lobby formation into the Grossman-Helpman 
model. To do so, he adds one preliminary stage to the common agency game where inputs 
owners in each sector must decide to form a lobby or not. To form a lobby, they must 
collectively incur an organizational cost that is sector specific. When deciding whether or not 
to get organized, the lobby groups take into account the benefits that they can obtain in the 
second stage of the political game by being organized and the losses they would incur by 
remaining unorganized.  
 
Mitra concludes that industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capital owners, more 
inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. As to 
the policy outcome, a surprising result he obtains is that the equilibrium trade subsidy for an 
organized group is no longer always positively related to the government's affinity for 
political contributions; in certain cases, the level of trade subsidy for each organized group 
turns out to be decreasing in the affinity for political contributions. This result is in contrast to 
the Grossman-Helpman result where the trade subsidy for each organized group is 
monotonically increasing in the government's interest in political contributions. 
 
The model 
The basic settings of the model are identical to those of Grossman-Helpman. However, Mitra 
makes slightly different symmetry assumptions. He lets Hi, denote the set of individuals who 
own the ith specific factor, and each of the sets is assumed to have m members who own 
equal amounts of the specific factor.  
 
The proportion of population that owns some factor of production besides labour is denoted 
by /mN Mθ =  (N is the number of sectors that produce nonnumeraire goods). It is also a 
measure of the degree of equality of the ownership of specific factors. From the indirect 
utility function of an individual and the assumption that each individual owns at most one 
type of specific factor, the total welfare of the set of individuals owning the ith specific factor 
is given by 
 [ ]( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )
i
h
i i
h H
l p M N r spi θ
∈
Ω = + + +∑p p p  (5.1) 
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For notational simplicity, it is from now on assumed that each individual in the economy is 
endowed with exactly l units of labour. At this point, a departure is made from the Grossman-
Helpman framework as the number of lobbies, n, will be endogenously determined.  
 
The model has two stages. In the first stage of the game, owners of each kind of specific 
factor decide whether to contribute to the financing of the fixed and sunk costs (defined in 
labour terms) of forming an organized lobby. These fixed costs consist of the costs of forming 
an organization, establishing links with politicians, hiring professional lobbyists, building a 
communications network among members, designing a scheme of punishments for defaulting 
members, etc. Forming a lobby can also be one way of getting closer to the government, so 
that political influence can be exercised on government's decision-making. In sectors without 
lobbies, transaction costs for communicating the offers or persuading the government are 
likely to be so high that political activity does not take place.   
 
In the second stage, the game proceeds in the same way as in Grossman-Helpman, with 
lobbies providing the government with their truthful contribution schedules and government 
setting the trade policy to maximize its objective function. The problem is solved by 
backward induction, and an equilibrium in this game is the number of lobbies formed n  and 
a domestic price vector p .  
 
Going back to the first stage, the fixed labour cost of lobby formation for the ith group of 
specific factors is denoted by Fi. Fixed costs here are heterogeneous because groups are 
assumed to differ in their organizational abilities: groups that have formed associations for 
other purposes (e.g., sharing technical know-how) may find it cheaper to get politically 
organized than other groups, and some groups may be geographically more concentrated than 
others.  
 
( )O nΩɶ  and ( )u nΩɶ  denote the equilibrium gross welfare of an organized group and of an 
unorganized group, respectively, when there are n lobbies. In addition, ( )C nɶ
 
denotes the 
equilibrium contribution by a representative organized group. Now, assuming i - 1 groups as 
organized, the members of another group decide whether to form a lobby or remain 
unorganized. The provision of the fixed cost of lobby formation is assumed to be the results 
43 
   
    
 
of a Nash bargaining between the group members. However, once the lobby is formed, the 
lobby machinery can enforce perfect coordination among the members of that group in the 
collection of political contributions. There are three possibilities that arise, and by studying 
them Mitra concludes that a lobby is formed under the following condition: 
 
 ( ) ( 1) ( ) > ,O u ii i C i FΩ − Ω − − ɶɶ ɶ
 (5.2) 
 
that is, when the net benefit from being organized exceeds the fixed costs of forming a lobby.  
 
The groups are then ranked and indexed in ascending order of their fixed costs such that  
 
min 1 2 1 1 max < ...<  <  < ...< .n n n NF F F F F F F F− +≤ ≤   (5.3) 
 
Since the number of lobbies is assumed to be continuous, the above equation means that 
( ) > 0.F n′  It can then be shown that if ( ) ( ) ( ) < ( ),O un n C n F n′ ′ ′ ′Ω − Ω − ɶɶ ɶ  that is, if the net 
increase in lobby welfare when being organized instead of unorganized increases less than the 
fixed costs when the number of already organized groups increases, there exists a unique 
Nash equilibrium, n0, for the number of lobbies, and it is the one that satisfies the condition 
0 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),O un n C n F nΩ − Ω − =ɶɶ ɶ  i.e. all groups with fixed costs less than or equal to 0( )F n
 
are organized.    
 
Mitra then assumes that there is a continuum of nonnumeraire goods and the totality of them 
is normalized to one so that [ ]0,1 .n ∈  He then defines gross and net benefits for a sector from 
lobby formation. By combining those expressions and differentiating with respect to n he 
obtains that both gross and net benefits from formation are decreasing in the number of 
lobbies already formed. Proceeding then to the determination of equilibrium contributions of 
organized sectors, Mitra obtains that the equilibrium contribution level by an organized sector 
compensates for the reduction in the gross welfare of the other existing organized groups and 
the reduction in the overall social welfare brought about by the formation of that organized 
group. The same result was found already in the GH model in the context of equilibrium 
contribution payments.  
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Other results of the paper are obtained by analyzing the comparative statics of the model. 
Mitra looks at the impacts of a change in the distribution of factor ownership, in the 
government’s affinity for contributions, and of changes in industry characteristics by 
loosening the symmetry assumptions between sectors. 
  
5.1.2  Other settings 
Didier Laussel (2006) builds his model with endogenous lobby formation on a slightly 
modified version of the lobbying model of Persson (1998). In Laussel’s model, interest 
groups hold different fixed endowments of an ‘infrastructure good’ which is a complement in 
the consumption of the local public good. The groups which benefit from larger infrastructure 
endowments are proved to be the ones which become organized because a relatively high 
infrastructure level increases both the absolute and the marginal utilities derived by the 
members from public good consumption. The size of the group is also an attribute that is 
positively correlated with the organizing probability of a given group, which is in contrast to 
the main Olsonian propositions. 
 
Like Mitra (1999) in the case of the Grossman-Helpman model, also Laussel incorporates the 
lobby formation as a preliminary stage into the model of Persson. In this first stage of the 
game, similarly again to Mitra, the groups decide to become organized or to stay unorganized 
given the expected costs they would incur and the expected benefits which they would derive 
from these decisions in the following stages. At a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, a lobby is 
formed if and only if the aggregate expected net benefits of its formation are positive. 
Technically, the main difficulty is to ensure that these costs and benefits are uniquely 
determined, that is, that the equilibrium of the second and third stages of the game is unique. 
To solve this technicality, Laussel draws on the work of Laussel and Le Breton (2001) on the 
structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency models to provide a simple condition 
which ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs: the cost-elasticity of the supply of 
public good function of the government should not be larger than 2.  
 
The model   
The total number of groups is assumed to be n (j = 1,2,…,n), and the set of all groups is N. 
Each group has Nj identical individuals belonging to it, and so the total number of individuals 
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belonging to a group is given by 
1
n
j
j
P N
=
= ∑ . The utility function of a member i of group j is 
given by 
 
ji i
j j j
j
g
U c Hσ
σ
 
= +   
 
 (5.4) 
 
where ijc  denotes the consumption of a private good, jg  is the per capita supply of a local 
public good, and  > 0jσ is a parameter which measures the exogenously fixed per capita level 
of a group specific infrastructure. A higher value of jσ
 
enables the members of the group to 
derive more utility from a given provision of the public good. This infrastructure good and the 
public good are complements in consumption, such as for instance hospitals and health 
expenditures. Each individual is assumed to have the same income level .y  
 
The provision of public goods is assumed to be financed through taxes per head jτ  which are 
proportional to the group specific observable per capita infrastructure levels, that is, j jτ τσ=  
where   0τ ≥  is a tax rate which is uniform over all groups.  
 
The model has three stages: In the first stage, members of each group j decide whether or not 
to contribute to the cost F of forming a lobby. This decision is a best response to the decisions 
simultaneously taken by the members of all other groups. As in Mitra (1999), a lobby will 
eventually be formed if and only if the aggregate benefit accruing to its members is at least 
equal to the fixed cost F. In the second stage, the organized groups choose their contribution 
schedules 
.jT  These schedules depend on the vector g of public good supplies to all of the n 
groups, organized or unorganized. The contributions paid by the members of the group have 
to cover the money transferred to the politician plus a fixed cost F of lobbying, that is, 
 
 ( ).ij j
i
t F T g= +∑  (5.5) 
In the third and final stage, the politician sets the provision of public good g in order to 
maximize an objective function familiar from the GH model.  
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The game is solved as usual by working backwards. Detailed descriptions of the solutions to 
the third and second stages of the game are laid out in the Laussel’s paper. I focus here on the 
formal handling of the first stage, the lobby formation. Laussel, like Mitra, assumes a 
continuum of lobbies. The aggregate infrastructure endowment level NσΩ =  is assumed to 
be continuously distributed over the interval , Ω Ω  .  
 
Laussel draws the conditions for the creation of a lobby by analysing the evolution of the 
benefits for a group j of getting organized instead of staying unorganized when the set of 
already organized groups is L. The benefit function is defined as ( , )L jB Λ Ω  where LΛ  is the 
aggregate infrastructure level of the already organized groups, and jΩ denotes the aggregate 
infrastructure level of group j. By differentiating the benefit function B with respect to LΛ  
Laussel draws the conclusion that, with certain assumptions, the benefit for group j from 
getting organized is a decreasing function of the number of groups that are already organized, 
and a strictly increasing function of its own infrastructure level (Lemma 3).  The relation of B 
with respect to α , the relative weight of social welfare in the government’s objective 
function, is not clear, but with certain general assumptions for the functions ( )H ρ , B can be 
concluded to be a strictly decreasing function of α  which conforms with the GH results.  
 
From the Lemma 3, Laussel continues to define three separate cases for the formation of 
lobby groups that may arise in the equilibrium, all of which are qualitatively the same as in 
Mitra (1999). First, all groups are organized if the benefit to any group from getting organized 
exceeds the fixed cost  F when all other groups in the economy are already organized.  
Second, no group is organized if B is lower than F for all groups. Third, if there is in the 
equilibrium a group that is indifferent between getting organized or remaining unorganized 
then all groups with a higher aggregate infrastructure level than this group get organized 
while the remainder of the groups abstain from political activity.  
 
The role of the group size is taken into discussion by noting that one of the assumptions in the 
model was that the level of infrastructure per individual is uniform across groups. Therefore, 
as the results indicate an increasing probability of getting organized as the aggregate 
infrastructure endowment level of the group is high, it is straightforward that larger groups 
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become organized in equilibrium while smaller ones remain unorganized. Assuming further 
that F would increase less than proportionately with the group size, only large groups would 
be organized in the equilibrium. These results would clash with the hypotheses of Olson on 
the group size and collective action. 
 
A different treatment of endogenous lobbying is offered by Felli and Merlo (2006) who 
endogeneize the number of lobby groups by assuming that the incumbent politician selects the 
interest groups she wants to bargain with. Their model does not represent the common agency 
tradition so it is not in the interest of this study to go through it in detail. However, the 
approach of Felli and Merlo differs from the usual way of making the number of lobbies 
endogenous so it is instructive to give a short summary here. The authors consider a citizen-
candidate model of electoral competition that builds on the work by Besley and Coate (2001). 
The political process is modelled as a multistage game that begins with the citizens’ decisions 
to participate in the political process as candidates for public office. Given the set of 
candidates, citizens vote in an election that selects the winner to choose policy for one period. 
After the election, lobbies try to influence the policy choice of the elected candidate through 
monetary contributions. Given the set of existing lobbies, the elected candidate, however, 
chooses the coalition of lobbies she will bargain with. One of the main results of the model is 
that in equilibrium, no elected candidate ever includes all lobbies in the bargaining process. 
Thus, not all lobbies are active in the game, but in this model it is due to some factor 
independent of the organizing capabilities of the interest groups.    
 
5.2  Asymmetric information 
All of the models referred to so far are complete-information models where uncertainty or 
asymmetric information plays no role. In particular, politicians are assumed to be perfectly 
informed about the characteristics of pressure groups and the latter in turn to have full 
information about the political preferences of decision makers and about the economy-wide 
consequences of policy choices. In practice, none of these assumptions is realistic. There 
might be incomplete information of the weight that the politician puts on social welfare, of the 
politician’s ideological strength or of his policy preferences as well as of the distribution of 
power in the government’s decision-making process. The case of asymmetric information 
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within common agency models is discussed for example by Le Breton and Salanié (2003), 
and Martimort and Semenov (2007, 2008).  
 
5.2.1  Models by Martimort and Semenov 
Martimort and Semenov (2007) introduce asymmetric information on a decision maker’s 
preferences in a common agency model where interest groups use nonlinear contribution 
schedules for two purposes: to compete for the agent’s services, and to learn about his 
preferences, that is, for screening the politicians. The authors deal with two kinds of 
asymmetries: horizontal asymmetries, in which there is uncertainty on the decision maker’s 
ideal policy point, and vertical asymmetries, in which the ideological strength of decision 
makers is unknown which translates into uncertainty on how much they value monetary 
contributions.  
 
The authors draw two main conclusions. First, asymmetric information redistributes 
bargaining power between interest groups and the politician in non-trivial ways. As such, 
asymmetric information is an important ingredient to explain some systematic biases of policy 
outcomes towards either some interest groups or the decision maker. Second, under 
asymmetric information, interest groups no longer contribute for a policy change as much as 
what it is worth to them under complete information. Instead, the groups’ contributions are 
lower to incorporate a discount related to their ability to solve the asymmetric information 
problem. This discount might be so large that some groups may prefer to abstain from 
contributions to decision makers who are seen as too hard to influence. Different groups do 
not suffer in the same way from paying this discount and this is reflected in the resulting 
influence on the political process.  
 
In the vertical differentiation, decision makers trade off social welfare maximization against 
the monetary contributions they receive from the lobbies. They have the same ideal policy but 
differ in terms of the weight they give to ideology, which is private information. The 
equilibrium policy in this case may be systematically biased towards the weakest interest 
group, the one whose preferences are further away from the decision maker in the policy 
space. In the horizontal differentiation, decision makers differ in terms of their most preferred 
policy and have private information on this parameter. The equilibrium policy might be 
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systematically biased towards the decision maker’s ideal point featuring some status quo bias 
of economic policy. Contributions in this case are small, sometimes even nonexistent when 
horizontal uncertainty is large enough.  
 
The underlying model 
Two interest groups (IG), P1 and P2 are assumed to influence a policymaker through 
monetary contributions, and the politician sets a policy q in a one-dimensional space. P1 has 
an ideal point located at a1 = a + b, whereas P2’s ideal point is located at 2 .a a= −
 
The 
politician’s ideal point is at θ. The IGs and the politician have quasi-linear utility functions, 
given by, respectively 
 
21 ( )   for 1, 2
2i i i
V q a t i= − − − =
 (5.6)
 
 
2
1 2( ) ,2U q t t
β θ= − − + +
 
 
where β  is a scale parameter capturing the intensity of the politician’s ideological 
preferences towards his own ideal point, and it  denotes non-negative contributions. Under 
horizontal asymmetric information, politicians differ in terms of their ideal points .θ  Under 
vertical asymmetric information, politicians have the same ideal point but differ in terms of 
their ideological bias .β  
 
The game proceeds like a standard common agency game with interest groups moving in the 
first stage and the politician in the second. Under complete information, the efficient policy 
( , )q θ β∗ , which maximizes the joint payoff of the interest groups and the politician, is a 
weighted average of the different players’ ideal points with weights reflecting their 
ideological biases: 
  
 ( , ) .
2
bq βθθ β β
∗ +
=
+
 (5.7) 
 
When b > 0, this policy is biased towards P1’s ideal point, which is further away from the 
politician’s own ideal point than P2’s6. P1 is therefore referred to as the weak principal, with 
P2 being the strong principal. The efficient outcome would be implemented using truthful 
contribution schedules, following the terminology of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).  
                                                
6
 The politician’s ideal point is assumed to be situated in point 0 on the same axis with the principals.  
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Vertical asymmetric information 
The politician has now private information on the parameter β  but this ideological bias is not 
too strong; β  is assumed to be uniformly distributed on 0, β    where 1β ≤ . For simplicity, it 
is assumed that the politician’s ideal point θ = 0. This setting results in an equilibrium 
( )eq β which is upward distorted with respect to first-best (0, ) :q β∗  
 ( ) (0, ),
2 3 2
e bq qβ ββ β
∗
= ≥
+ −
 with equality only at .β β=  (5.8) 
 
The politician always gets a positive payoff in equilibrium, and the weak principal’s marginal 
contribution is greater than that of the strong principal.  
 
Each IG clearly wants to push the policy towards his own ideal point. In the absence of the 
other group’s contribution, this requires a greater (lower) transfer when the politician has a 
strong (weak) ideological bias. A strong ideological bias translates here to a high value of .β  
This being said, under asymmetric information, in the absence of the other group’s 
contribution, a politician with a low ideological bias would be tempted to exaggerate this bias 
to receive greater contributions from the IG. This would leave a positive information rent to 
politicians having small ideological biases.  
 
When, instead, IGs compete for favours, both offer large contributions to the politicians with 
a small .β  Politicians with stronger ideological biases find it now attractive to pretend having 
less. Because IGs have opposing preferences each of them can only mitigate the equilibrium 
policy that the other would induce being alone. This makes the policy less sensitive to the 
politician’s ideological bias. To limit the extra rent left to politicians with stronger ideological 
biases, both IGs offer contributions which have less mitigating power compared to what they 
offer when knowing .β  This is true for both principals but the strong one does so even more. 
As the contributions are designed to counter the other IG’s preferences, the weak IG’s 
marginal contribution is greater because the strong one is close to the politician in the policy 
space. At equilibrium, the chosen policy is thus upward distorted for all types  < .β β  Vertical 
asymmetric information thus redistributes the bargaining power somewhat in favour of the 
weakest IG. The assumption that the IGs are asymmetric (i.e. b > 0) is crucial here. Otherwise 
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the first-best efficient policy would always be the agent’s ideal point even under asymmetric 
information.  
 
Horizontal asymmetric information 
Under horizontal asymmetric information, the politician’s ideal point θ  is private information 
and drawn uniformly from an interval [ ], .δ δ−
 
To simplify the model, both IGs are assumed 
to be symmetrically located around 0, that is, b = 0. The politician’s ideological preferences 
are now assumed to be sufficiently pronounced.  
 
To understand the impact of horizontal asymmetric information, it is first useful to think of P1 
as being the only IG around. It is first assumed that  > ,a δ
 
that is, whatever the agent’s ideal 
point the IG’s preference is more extreme. Under asymmetric information, more extreme 
politicians who are closer to P1’s ideal point would like to appear more moderate to grasp the 
high contributions that P1 would offer for more moderate politicians. To avoid this, P1 
increases the distance between the policy suggested to moderate types and his own ideal 
point. Reducing the information rent of extremist politicians calls for distorting the policy in 
the direction of the agent’s ideal point and paying less transfer to moderate types. However, 
P1 is constrained in doing so by the fact that the politician may always refuse any contribution 
and choose the status quo policy. Asymmetric information undermines significantly the 
influence of IGs as soon as horizontal uncertainty is large enough. As they are symmetrically 
located around the agent’s expected ideal point, none of the IGs gains anything from this bias 
contrary to the case of vertical uncertainty.  
 
Martimort and Semenov (2008) continue from where their previous article stayed and give a 
more comprehensive analysis of a common agency game under asymmetric information. This 
article builds on the model introduced in the previous paper and enriches it by looking at 
numerous alternative settings and strategies that could occur in the policy game. The authors 
divide the analysis into several subproblems. To start with, interest groups (assumed to be 
two) form a coalition giving rise to two alternative scenarios. In case the politician’s 
ideological bias ( β ) is weak (i.e. low in value) then the optimal policy is inefficient and 
distorted towards the politician’s ideal point θ . Moderate politicians get information rent by 
exaggerating their policy stance, whereas politicians with an extreme viewpoint do not gain 
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any rent. In case the ideological bias is strong ( β  is high) then the coalition of interest groups 
does not contribute at all and the optimal policy coincides with that of the politician’s ideal.  
 
In the presence of competing interest groups, three main scenarios arise. First, a laissez-faire 
equilibrium results when there is a strong ideological bias combined with a large horizontal 
uncertainty. In that case the politician puts significant weight on ideology, and the interest 
groups’ ideal points lie both within the interval defined by the most extreme possible views of 
the politician. As a consequence, there is no contribution from either of the interest groups, 
and the politician implements his ideal policy. Even when the ideological distance between 
the politician and an interest group is small, the latter cannot ensure that the former will only 
follow his own recommendation because there is too much uncertainty in the politician’s 
preferences which may be too distant from those of the group. This result is the same as in the 
Grossman-Helpman model with all sectors represented by a lobby who ultimately cancel each 
other out.  
 
Second, when the degree of polarization between the interest groups increases (or respectively 
the horizontal ideological uncertainty of the politician decreases), the market for influence 
becomes segmented with interest groups on both sides of the political spectrum being linked 
in exclusive relationships with decision makers who are sufficiently close ideologically. The 
authors call this situation a partition equilibrium of type 1. By definition, in this equilibrium, 
principal i offers a positive contribution only on a non-empty subset iΩ  of the interval of the 
politician’s possible policy stances. Moreover, the principals’ areas of influence are 
disconnected, so that they do not overlap each other. A partition equilibrium of type 1 is 
symmetric when there exists (0, )τ δ∈  such that [ ] [ ]2 1,  and , .δ τ τ δΩ = − − Ω =  Between 
these two subsets is the area [ ]0 ,τ τΩ = −  where none of the principals contribute. Thus, if the 
realized stance of the politician is sufficiently extreme and thus falls in either of the interest 
groups’ subsets, that group is able to influence the final policy choice by contributing. 
Otherwise, for moderate politicians for whom θ  falls on the interval 0Ω , the equilibrium 
policy is equal to the politician’s ideal point in which case she would not obtain any 
information rent.  A partition equilibrium shares some common features with the laissez-faire 
equilibrium. In both cases, the decision maker might be freed from the principals’ influence 
but in the partition equilibrium this happens only when the politician is sufficiently moderate. 
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Interest groups are now able to exercise unchallenged influence when their ideological 
distance with the politician is small. The most extreme politicians are thus linked in exclusive 
relationships with nearby groups.  
 
Third, a modification from the previous scenario, a partition equilibrium of type 2, arises 
when the politician’s horizontal ideological uncertainty decreases further. Now, both interest 
groups suffer less from not knowing the agent’s preferences, and even moderate politicians 
receive positive contributions from both interest groups. The influence areas of the interest 
groups thus overlap. A partition equilibrium of type 2 is symmetric when there exists 
(0, )τ δ∈  such that [ ] [ ]2 1,  and , .δ τ τ δΩ = − Ω = −  The overlapping area, where both groups 
simultaneously contribute, is given by 1 2 0.Ω ∩ Ω = Ω  In such a case, the equilibrium policy 
reflects the preferences of both groups only for moderate politicians and is otherwise biased 
towards the preferences of the nearby group for more extreme politicians.  
 
In summary, Martimort and Semenov list some central elements that are highlighted in both 
of their papers. Firstly, under asymmetric information, competition between interest groups 
leads to huge inefficiencies in policy choices. There always exists a strong bias towards the 
politician’s ideal point. If ideological uncertainty is very large, transaction costs become also 
large and interest groups might refrain from contributions. When the politician’s ideological 
bias is strong and there is sufficient horizontal uncertainty, interest groups may not contribute 
to a politician whose ideal point lies too far away from their own preferences. The market for 
influence is segmented with exclusive relationships between politicians and interest groups 
whose preferences are close in the political spectrum.  
 
As horizontal uncertainty decreases, the areas of influence of competing interest groups begin 
to overlap. More extreme legislators continue to collect most contributions though they may 
still receive contributions from opposing groups. For example, one should expect older 
decision makers whose views are better known to gain more support from both sides of the 
political spectrum.  
 
If the decision maker’s ideological bias is not too strong, possibly due to the fact that the 
policy at stake is sector specific and has little appeal for the general public, interest groups 
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always contribute. However, the nature of competition is highly dependent on the amount of 
ideological (horizontal) uncertainty. When groups face much uncertainty they are more 
congruent and the pattern of contributions may reflect some cooperation. On the other hand, 
with less uncertainty on the politician’s ideology, competition induces interest groups to raise 
contributions even for the most extreme politicians.  
 
5.2.2  Other settings  
Le Breton and Salanié (2003) add asymmetric information into a common agency model in an 
abstract policy space. They depart from the basic setting of Grossman-Helpman by assuming 
that the type of the politician is not common knowledge. This is done by inserting into the 
model the assumption that a parameter α , the weight of social welfare in the politician’s 
payoff function, is private information to the politician.  Technically, this assumption 
transforms the original common agency game into a common agency game with adverse 
selection. This reflects the view that lobbyists do not know for sure how costly it is to buy the 
favour of a politician. 
 
In the first section of the paper, the authors concentrate on a binary setting where the 
politician can choose among two possible decisions – the status quo or an alternative policy. 
In this setting, the society can be divided into two natural interest groups: those who gain and 
those who lose when moving from one decision to the other. As a conclusion, the proportion 
of ‘bad’ politicians (with a low α ) must be above some critical value depending on the 
characteristics of the two groups and the magnitude of the stake. If there are too few bad 
politicians, supporters of the efficient decision are willing to endorse the risk of losing in 
return for lower contributions to the politician. The authors also study the free-rider problems 
of lobby group formation in the light of the Olson’s hypotheses. In that respect the model 
would also belong to the category of endogenous lobby formation discussed earlier. 
 
The model setup 
A politician must choose between two policies, 1 2 and .a a This choice affects the payoffs of n 
principals identified by the subscript i. The payoff of the agent and the principals depends on 
the policy selected and on monetary transfers. The set of principals is partitioned into two sets 
according to whether they prefer the first or the second policy alternative. In the first set, 1,I
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principals are characterized by their surplus 1 1> 0 if 
iV a  is chosen instead of a2. In the second 
set, 2 ,I  principals are characterized by their surplus 2 2 > 0 if 
iV a  is chosen instead of a1.  
 
The total surplus of principals if policy ak is chosen is denoted by Wk, and it is further 
assumed that 
 
2 1
2 1 2 1  > 0.
i i
i I i I
W W V V
∈ ∈
∆ = − = −∑ ∑  (5.9) 
 
Following from this, the efficient decision is now 2a .  
 
In the two-stage game that follows, each principal, instead of being represented by a lobby 
group, is assumed to act alone and to offer a contribution to the politician. This serves as a 
way to avoid the free-rider problem of group formation.  In the second stage, the politician 
selects the decision which maximizes his payoff defined as a sum of total welfare of 
principals (W) weighted by α and the total amount of transfers (T). If decision ak is chosen, 
principal Pi gets  if i ik k kV T i I− ∈  and 
i
kT−  otherwise. The politician gets .
i
k ki
W Tα +∑  For 
simplicity, it is assumed that a transfer is paid by a principal only if his preferred decision is 
selected. Therefore, 2 10 for ,
iT i I= ∈
 and 1 20 for .
iT i I= ∈ The efficient decision will then be 
selected if 
 
2 1
2 1  .
i i
i I i I
T Tα
∈ ∈
∆ + ≥∑ ∑  (5.10) 
In other words, the efficient decision is obtained if the transfers for choosing policy 1 do not 
exceed the value of transfers for choosing policy 2 plus the aggregate welfare gain from the 
efficient policy choice.  
 
Incomplete information on α  
It is now supposed that α  is a random variable whose distribution is common knowledge but 
whose realization is known only to the politician when the game begins. More precisely, α  is 
drawn from the interval [ ],  ( 0),α α α ≥  with cumulative density function F and density 
function f which is assumed to be positive on the whole interval. A politician of type α  will 
select the efficient decision if α  is above some threshold 0 :α  
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2
1 2
0 > .
i
i i
i I i I
T T
α α∈ ∈
−
≡
∆
∑ ∑
 (5.11) 
 
After denoting by T the vector of transfers, the principals’ payoff functions are: 
 
 
1 1 0 1
2 2 0 2
( ) ( ) ( ),  when 
( ) ( )(1 ( )),  when 
i i
i
i i
i
T V T F i I
T V T F i I
α
α
Π = − ∈
Π = − − ∈
 (5.12) 
 
This means that principal i who belongs to I1 pays a positive contribution and receives a net 
payoff of 1( )TΠ only when α  is below the threshold 0 ,α thus with probability 0( ).F α  A 
principal belonging to I2 receives a payoff of  2 ( )TΠ  when 0 > ,α α that is, with probability 
0(1 ( )).F α−  The authors then determine the transfers 1 2 and i iT T  paid by principals in both 
interest groups and substitute them into the expression (5.11) in order to obtain the condition 
for the policy outcome to be the efficient one (a2).  
 
In a more general case, with more than two policy choices, the common agency problem with 
adverse selection is more complicated, and Le Breton and Salanié are not able to provide a 
full characterization of efficiency. Instead, they derive disjoint necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an equilibrium to be efficient. The proportion of ‘bad’ politicians is important 
in the general case as well.   
 
Mike Felgenhauer (2007) treats information asymmetries as well although in a somewhat 
different model of common agency where the equilibrium is reached by using mixed rather 
than pure strategies. In the model, it is assumed that a policymaker has to choose among two 
alternatives and has private information about the welfare maximizing option, i.e. his optimal 
policy point. The decision maker responds to the lobbies’ contributions, but also cares for the 
socially best alternative. These preferences are mirrored in the auction: in order to win with 
certainty, a lobby has to outbid its rival at least by a constant ∆ , where ∆  reflects the 
policymaker’s preference for the social optimum. Otherwise the policymaker chooses her 
ideal point and collects the bribes from the corresponding interest group. Lobbies are assumed 
to have identical valuation for their preferred policies so that the information transmission 
purpose of contributions is left aside.  
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The model 
There is a policymaker who has to decide upon policy x that may be either 1 or 0. The 
policymaker is an expert, who knows which decision is best for society, but this knowledge is 
her private information. Ex ante, each of the policies is welfare maximizing with equal 
probability. The policymaker has a valuation 0∆ ≥ for choosing the social optimum. Her 
utility function is given by  
 0 1,u y t t= ∆ + +  (5.13) 
 
where tj is the contribution from interest group j, and y is a dummy which gets the value of 1 
if the socially best policy is chosen and zero otherwise.  
 
There are two interest groups 0,1,j =  who prefer either policy 0 or 1, respectively. Both 
groups have the same valuation θ  for their preferred policy. The utility functions of the 
groups are given by 1 1 0 0 and (1 ) .u x t u x tθ θ= − = − −  The timing of the game is the same as 
usual, but before the contribution offers from lobbies the policymaker privately observes the 
welfare maximizing policy.  
 
Felgenhauer shows that an equilibrium in the game is found only in mixed strategies, and any 
equilibrium in mixed strategies implies welfare inefficiencies. Surprisingly, however, these 
inefficiencies are found to be the same for different levels of the decision maker’s valuation 
∆  for the best policy. Thus, in the class of mixed strategy equilibria, if there were two 
candidates for the policy make’s job, an electorate should be indifferent between the two, 
even if one of them intrinsically cares more for the social optimum. 
 
Epstein, Milchtaich, Nitzan and Schwarz (2007) introduce an appealing idea which the 
existing common agency models have neglected: there is likely to be asymmetric information 
concerning the power distribution within a set of potential sources of power in a legislative 
structure. Interest groups may have a list of potential decisive agents but no firm information 
regarding the identity of the decisive agent – the true target of their efforts. From the 
contestants’ point of view, resources directed to the wrong agent are simply a waste. Under 
such uncertainty, it makes sense to direct resources to several potential “power centers”. The 
essential question is then how much effort to make and how to allocate it among the potential 
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power centers. Epstein et al. have treated this topic in a symmetric lottery contest, but the idea 
could well be transferred also under a common agency model.   
 
5.3  Hierarchical governments 
Another significant matter that the basic GH model does not address is the fact that political 
decisions are taken on several levels with part of the decision power delegated from the 
government to lower, executive levels enjoying some degree of autonomy. Examples of such 
structures are offered by a combination of a legislature and a bureaucracy, a president and a 
parliament, or the board of directors and an executive officer in a firm’s governance. 
Furthermore, besides targeting policymakers at different tiers within a single governmental 
body, interest groups may target them at different governmental levels like the municipal, 
state, or national level. This implies that competition among lobbies extends from a single tier 
to several tiers making lobbying more complex than in usual formalizations. So far, however, 
hierarchical decision making has been discussed in relatively few common agency studies.  
 
5.3.1  Models by Mazza and Van Winden 
In Mazza and Van Winden (2008), policies are the result of the choices made by two agents 
within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a 
bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of 
sequential decision making and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one 
tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and 
the agent at the other tier.  
 
Mazza and Van Winden remind that the existence of multiple opportunities to influence 
decision making needs not be as advantageous for an interest group as it may seem at first 
sight. For example, a multi-tier process of decision making could increase lobbying 
expenditures because a group might need to influence more agents in order to obtain a 
favourable policy. The outcome of lobbying is also more difficult to predict. Lobbying a 
policymaker may trigger responses by decision makers at other tiers whose behaviour cannot 
be completely controlled through the policymaker that is lobbied.  
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The model of Mazza and Van Winden is summarized as follows. At the higher level, a 
legislator (L) decides on the size of the tax revenue needed to finance two public goods, each 
of which is consumed by a different group of people. L is interested in the welfare of the 
different groups as well as in the contributions they can offer. Moreover, L has distinct 
preferences concerning the allocation of the budget across the public goods, but this is 
effectively decided at a lower level, by a bureaucrat (B). B can only disregard the preferences 
of L at a personal cost, for example, in terms of career prospects or loyalty. However, B may 
be compensated by the interest groups for skewing the budget allocation to a certain direction. 
 
The model setup 
Mazza and Van Winder consider an economy where individuals are divided into two groups, 
of size n1 and n2. The members of each group derive utility from disposable income and the 
consumption of a group-specific pure public good iG  financed by tax t on gross income .iy  
Thus, individual utility is given by (1 ) ( ) for 1, 2.i i i iu t y h G i= − + =  The supply of the public 
goods results from the policy choices made by two public agents, L and B, at different levels. 
L chooses t while B determines the share s (or 1-s) of the resulting tax revenue R to be 
allocated for the production of G1 (or G2). Public goods are produced according to 
1 2 and (1 ) .G sR G s R= = −  An interest group i wishing to influence decision making offers a 
contribution schedule ( )iC t to L and a schedule ( )iE s  to B. A net welfare function for group i 
subtracts the lobbying expenditures from the aggregate utility of the group: 
 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ),   1, 2.i i i iV U s t C t E s i= − − =  (5.14) 
 
The objective function of the legislator L is given by 
 
 ( ) ( , ),   , ,  > 0,L i i i i i ii iP l C t l V s t l lθ θ= +∑ ∑  (5.15) 
 
where il  reflects the ‘shadow price’ that group i faces when lobbying L, l indicates the 
preference of L for social welfare relative to contributions, and iθ  denotes the political weight 
of group i. Lobbying requires that the net benefit from it to L be positive, that is, the shadow 
price of lobbying should be sufficiently low (i.e. il  sufficiently high) compared to L’s interest 
in the group’s welfare.  
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As for the bureaucrat, he is assumed to have the possibility for some opportunistic behaviour 
with lobbies. On the other hand, B is constrained by L’s objective function. This may be for 
example due to bureaucratic loyalty or career concerns. B chooses s in order to maximize 
 
 ( ) ( , ),   ,  > 0,B i i L iiP b E s bP s t b b= +∑  (5.16) 
 
where ib reflects the shadow price of lobbying B, b indicates the weight that B attaches to the 
objective of L, that is, the degree of indirect control of L over B. From the objectives of L and 
B it follows that a group is only able to lobby B if  > .i ib blθ  
 
The timing of the game follows the usual manner, with the lobbies announcing their offers in 
the first stage and the decision maker maximizing her objective after that. Now the game is 
however played twice in a row, first at the upper tier and then at the lower one.   
 
Monopsonistic lobbying 
It is first supposed that group 2 does not take part in lobbying activity and so there is only one 
lobby group, and C2 = E2 = 0. A subgame-perfect equilibrium at the lower tier is made up of 
a policy-contribution pair 1( , )l ls E such that the interest group makes a truthful contribution, 
while the policy selected by B maximizes BP  given the contribution schedule offered by the 
lobby. The superscript l is used to denote the case when there is lobbying activity from the 
side of group 1. As usual, for any given t and C1, the equilibrium maximizes the joint welfare 
of the lobby and B, and ls  is thus determined by 
 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 0,l ls sbU s bl U sθ+ =  (5.17) 
 
where the subscript s denotes partial derivative with respect to s. This equation can be seen as 
a maximization of a weighted gross political welfare function where the organized interest 
group benefits from a larger weight than the unorganized group 2 (as  > i ib blθ ). As a 
consequence, lobbying increases the group’s share of the overall budget and the group has an 
incentive to lobby B.  
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The problem at the upper tier is solved in a similar manner, taking into account 1 and 
l ls E  
from the earlier stage. L’s optimal policy is implicitly determined by 
 
 1 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0.l l l lt t tl U t E t l tθ − + =   (5.18) 
 
Using the equation for L’s objective function and the fact that the lobby pays a contribution 
1
lC  that leaves L indifferent between the tax rate lt  and the rate ut that would be optimal for L 
in the absence of lobbying at his tier, Mazza and Van Winden show that the group 1 will not 
loose from lobbying L even if it already lobbies B.  
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the results of the game. Firstly, lobbying can be harmful 
to both policymakers. Although each decision maker is just compensated for giving in to the 
lobby, the fall-back outcome is changed by lobbying at the other tier. L can never gain from 
lobbying at the lower tier because both the contributions paid to B and the policy change it 
induces there represents a net loss for L. The effect of lobbying at the higher level on the 
welfare of B can be positive or negative, depending on its effect on the tax rate and the sign of 
the impact of the tax rate on the contribution 1
lE  paid to B.  
 
Competitive lobbying and comparative statics 
After the benchmark case of only one contributing lobby group, Mazza and Van Winden 
discuss the implications of competitive lobbying, with both interest groups being politically 
active. The basic mechanics of the model remain the same although competition among 
interest groups produces somewhat different outcomes for all actors. In contrast to the 
monopsonist case, under competitive lobbying both decision makers may benefit from 
lobbying. On the other hand, competitive lobbying may be detrimental to both lobby groups 
as they find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma with lobbying being the dominant strategy at 
each tier.  
 
The authors consider also some comparative statics of competitive lobbying. They make three 
remarks: (i) The reaction of L to an increase in a group’s effectiveness in lobbying B may be 
to reduce the level of overall budget directed to the provision of the group’s public good 
(through a decrease in the tax rate). So, although a group is able to increase the share of the 
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budget spent on its public good, the absolute level of the budget may decrease through a 
reduction in tax revenues induced by L. This is the same intuition as found in Mazza and Van 
Winden (2002) where they conclude, in a similar game setting, that centralization of 
policymaking in the EU level may lead to a smaller EU budget than under a decentralized 
structure. The federal budget, in that case, represents a form of incentive scheme to limit 
lobbying expenditure at the lower agency level.  
 
(ii) An improvement of group j’s effectiveness in lobbying L induces group i to shift 
resources to L’s tier if its own effectiveness in lobbying L is sufficiently higher relative to 
group j. (iii) For any given t and C, a stronger influence of L on B (larger b) has no effect on 
B’s policy but reduces lobbying expenditure 1 2( ).E E∗ ∗+  The latter result may be reversed 
through a positive effect of b on t∗ (and thus on the level of tax revenues to be allocated). The 
positive effect may come about because it induces B to better regard the preferences of L. This 
may in turn boost lobbying expenditure on B and give one reason why lobby groups may be 
more interested in lobbying bureaucrats than legislators.  In fact, as the authors note, 
competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for 
legislatorial oversight. 
 
5.3.2  Models with an agenda setter  
When treating the hierarchical processes in policy making, it is practical to make use of 
decision making structures including an agenda setter. This is the focus of for example 
Dharmapala (1999) and Bergemann & Välimäki (2001). Dharmapala (1999) adopts the 
Grossman-Helpman model to analyze decision making by legislative committees. He aims to 
compare two possible institutional structures through which a legislature may choose taxes or 
subsidies for each of the economy’s n sectors. The first of these involves empowering a 
committee to decide simultaneously on the policies relating to all sectors. This is called a tax 
committee approach (TC). The alternative structure involves establishing n separate 
specialized committees each one deciding only over the policy imposed for its own sector, in 
isolation from the other sectors and committees. This is referred to as specialized committee 
structure (SC).  
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As the TC has the power to decide on the entire vector p of producer prices, it is able to offer 
subsidies to the organized sectors at the cost of unorganized sectors which would be imposed 
taxes. In contrast, SC i chooses only pi which means that the committee cannot affect policies 
on other sectors than its own. Under the SC structure then, lobbies have to decide to which 
committees they should direct their lobbying efforts. Dharmapala approaches the problem by 
studying the two extreme cases between which the optimal strategies must lie: either all 
organized groups lobby all specialized committees or then each group chooses only one 
committee to lobby.   
 
In analyzing the policy outcomes in the TC and SC regimes, Dharmapala notes that the 
internal decision-making processes of the committees is crucial for the results.  Thus, he 
analyses separately three different characterizations of the committee decision-making 
process: the agenda setter dominated (A), majoritarian (M), and universalistic (U) processes.  
In the A model, one member of the committee is exogenously selected to be the agenda setter. 
He has the power to make a proposal which the other committee members are not allowed to 
amend. In the M model, all members have the right to make proposals and amendments to 
others’ proposals. Each decision is based on a vote that follows a majority rule. In the U 
model, each decision maker enjoys exclusive proposal power over a subset of the committee’s 
sphere of jurisdiction, and these proposals are voted against a reference option.  
 
Agenda setter dominated committees are assumed to consist of l members who seek to 
maximize a weighted sum of monetary contributions and social welfare. Considering first a 
TC model, Dharmapala denotes by ATp  the vector of producer prices enacted by the 
committee and by ATPp the proposal made by the agenda setter. The game proceeds as 
follows. In the first stage, organized groups lobby the agenda setter by offering her 
contribution schedules conditioned on ATp . In the second stage, the agenda setter chooses a 
policy to propose to the committee. The policy is chosen to maximize an objective function 
familiar from the GH model with attention given to both contributions and social welfare. In 
the third stage, the agenda setter bargains with the other members of the committee by making 
them take-it-or-leave-it offers conditional on their vote in the final stage of the game. Each 
committee member maximizes an objective function including both social welfare and the 
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transfers offered by the agenda setter. In the final stage, the committee votes on ATPp against 
the default alternative of undistorted world prices .∗p  
 
The game is solved using backward induction. Dharmapala makes the proposition that the 
unique equilibrium of the committee voting game is for all members to vote for the proposal 
ATPp . Thus, the outcome which emerges from the vote is ATPp = ATp . The agenda setter 
anticipates this, and maximizes her welfare by choosing ATPp accordingly, given the 
contribution schedules offered by the interest groups. In the first stage, when the lobby groups 
use truthful strategies, the optimal policy maximizes the joint surplus of the agenda setter and 
the lobbies. The maximization problem yields results which are in line with those obtained in 
the GH model.  
 
Under the specialized committee structure, the legislature is divided into n separate 
committees. It is first assumed that all organized groups simultaneously lobby all the 
specialized committees. The timing of this game is as follows. First, all groups lobby 
committee i’s agenda setter, A. Then, A chooses a proposal ASPip . In the third stage, A offers 
transfers to the other committee members, and finally the committee votes on the proposal. 
Letting ASLip  be the i’th producer price enacted when all organized groups lobby SC i, 
Dharmapala shows that the result from the game is identical to that arising from the TC 
structure.  
 
However, as Dharmapala remarks, lobbying is constrained by transaction costs and issues of 
credibility. Developing a relationship of credibility with a committee, let alone with n 
committees is costly, and these transaction costs, which are likely to be increasing in the 
number of committees lobbied, will be balanced against the expected benefits from lobbying. 
As a result, groups can be expected to lobby some, but not all committees. Thus, Dharmapala 
introduces a case with restricted lobbying where each group lobbies only one specialized 
committee. The timing is now as follows. The i’th SC is lobbied by i’th group if that group is 
organized; otherwise, it is not lobbied at all. In other respects the game is similar to that in the 
previous case where an agenda setter, instead of being lobbied by only one group, was 
lobbied by all groups. Solving the game follows thus the same principles as in the both cases 
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discussed earlier, with the result being also analogous to that obtained earlier. A different 
result follows if the agenda setter in SC i does not face any lobbying. Then she selects the 
producer price for the sector i to be identical to the world price.   
 
The treatment of majoritarian and universalistic committees follows the same lines as in the 
agenda setter dominated committees so it is not worthwhile to spell out a detailed description 
of those models. After studying the outcomes of all the six games that arise out of the three 
committee decision-making processes combined with both a TC and an SC regime, 
Dharmapala draws the conclusion that the tax committee structure is likely to give rise to 
lower subsidy levels than the specialized committee structure.  
 
Bergemann and Välimäki (2001) apply a dynamic common agency model to a game of 
agenda setting. The motivation for the dynamic model structure is the fact that political 
choices are rarely made only once, and the future implications of a current decision are often 
more important than the immediate impacts of the policies. A dynamic perspective is of 
particular need, if the politician and the lobbyists cannot commit to future actions and 
transfers. The authors first introduce a very simple dynamic common agency model with only 
two time periods. In the first stage, the agent chooses the actions that are available in the 
second period. The common agency game itself, with the set of possible actions determined 
earlier, is played in the second period. Given that the agent initially decides on the actions that 
form the basis for the choice in the second stage, this game resembles technically an agenda 
setting game. The authors conclude from this simple model that the outcome of the game is 
efficient if the agent can be lobbied in both stages, and the payoff to the agent is higher in this 
game compared to a static, one-period game. This main feature of the model carries over to 
more general dynamic models as well.   
 
The idea of the game is that the agent has the power to set the agenda by selecting a subset of 
an exogenously given set of feasible actions. This is done in the initial period. Then, in the 
subsequent period, the principals bid on the actions on the agenda, like in a static menu-
auction game. The principals are however allowed to influence the same agent in his selection 
of the agenda in the initial period, which extends the game over two periods and thus makes it 
a dynamic game. More formally, in period 0, each principal bids on the subset A chosen by 
the agent from the set of feasible actions. The agent receives a reward ( )ir A from principal i if 
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he selects the subset A for the second stage. The choice of A is costless to the agent and it has 
no immediate payoff consequences for the principals. The eventual choice of the agent in 
period 1 is, however, restricted to the subset A. The main difference of the model to the basic 
static common agency model is that by selecting an action today, the agent can change the 
nature of competition among principals tomorrow. The agent naturally prefers such a subset 
of actions that increase competition among the principals in the second period and thus give 
rise to higher equilibrium payoffs to the agent.  
 
5.4  Other aspects 
This section takes up briefly some additional issues that have aroused academic discussion in 
relation to the basic GH model to show that there still remain several debatable topics within 
common agency models. As mentioned in the previous section, Bergemann and Välimäki 
(2001) have analyzed the common agency framework in a dynamic setting where the game 
extends over several time periods. Dynamic common agency is adopted also in the work of 
Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005) who consider interaction between overlapping generations 
and policymakers in a model where competing generations invest resources to lobby either for 
the maintenance of the current technology or for the adoption of a new one. It is assumed that 
the young prefer innovation and progression while the older generation is more conservative.  
 
Prat and Rustichini (2003) remark that, given that modern democracies are characterized by a 
multiplicity of public decision makers, the assumption of a unique politician in common-
agency models is unrealistic. They introduce a game of complete information with many 
principals and many common agents. Each agent makes a decision that affects the payoffs of 
all principals, and each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on his 
action chosen. Technically the game set up is analogous to the usual common agency game, 
although now principals offer contributions to several agents simultaneously. The authors 
assume that the transfer from a principal to an agent is only conditional on the action chosen 
by the given agent. However, it is recognized that the transfer could also depend on the 
actions chosen by other agents in which case agents would have an incentive to influence 
each other’s choices.  
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In the paper of Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001), the authors ask whether the truthful equilibrium 
laid out by Bernheim and Whinston is the only reasonable equilibrium. They claim that the 
truthful equilibrium may be quite complex and it is difficult for players to arrive at the truthful 
strategy equilibrium. Moreover, if a principal is not sure what the other principals are doing, 
playing truthful may be risky. The standpoint of Kirchsteiger and Prat is to see principals 
behaving in a simpler way. Instead of making positive offers on all, or most, possible 
alternatives as the truthful equilibrium requires, each principal makes only one strictly 
positive offer on the alternative that she hopes to get. Such a strategy is called natural and, if it 
exists, the corresponding equilibrium is also natural. 
 
Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) develop a more generalized version of the Grossman-
Helpman model. Their main concern is the common agency model’s assumption of a quasi-
linear utility function for individuals which they claim is inappropriate by not allowing one to 
analyze the distributional concerns of policy making. Since quasi-linearity implies constant 
marginal utility of income for individuals, utility is assumed to be perfectly transferable 
between players in the common agency framework. By definition, utility is transferable if one 
player can transfer part of his utility to another player without altering the total utility of the 
group of players. It is thus assumed that an additional unit of money is valued equally by all 
players. Quasi-linearity therefore makes the agent’s actions independent of the distribution of 
payoffs among the principals. Often however, wealthy and poor players may derive a 
different utility from the same amount of money, and in reality, politicians often care about 
income inequality. The authors remind that in many economic applications money itself is 
transferable but the players’ payoffs are not linear in money. Their paper generalizes the 
common agency theory to handle such situations. The indirect utility function of individuals is 
assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave in income, and the marginal utility of 
income goes to infinity as a given lower bound to income is approached. The authors show 
that, even when utility is not transferable across players, the agent’s actions in equilibrium 
still achieve a jointly efficient outcome.   
 
Krishna and Mitra (2005) study the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on 
its partner’s trade policies. Specifically, they are interested in examining the question of 
whether unilateral trade liberalization by one country could induce reciprocal liberalization by 
its partner in the absence of any communication or negotiation between the two countries. 
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They find that such unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the 
incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against 
the import-competing lobby there for lower protection.  
 
The model of Krishna and Mitra considers a small open economy that trades with a large 
partner. The production side of the economy is assumed to consist of the production of three 
goods: an import-competing good, an exportable, and a numeraire good that uses labour 
alone. Each individual owns some of the specific factor used in the production of either of the 
goods. Formation of organized lobbies itself is treated as being endogenous, as in Mitra 
(1999). Free trade is the policy outcome if both industries are organized. In the initial 
situation, the import-competing sector in the small country is represented by an organized 
lobby but the exportable sector is not. Consequently, the country’s trade policy vector, being 
determined between the import-competing group and the government, is characterized by 
import tariffs and export taxes; the latter aimed to lowering the lobby’s cost of consuming the 
exportable good.  
 
In this context, unilateral liberalization by the large partner country is shown to increase the 
incentives for the formation of an export lobby in the small country. This happens for two 
reasons. First, a higher world price of the exportable good, which is induced by the 
liberalization, makes the existing trade policy vector more costly for the export lobby. 
Secondly, at higher export prices, the import-competing lobby has incentives to lobby for a 
trade policy vector even more biased against the exporting lobby, further raising the 
incentives for formation of the export lobby. Once formed, this export lobby then competes 
with the import competing lobby in trying to reduce domestic tariffs and export taxes. 
Unilateral liberalization by one country therefore has a strategic effect on the relevant groups 
in the partner country so that ultimately freer trade is the outcome.  
 
6  Ideas for further research 
The preceding chapters have looked at early research on endogenous policy theory, at the 
emergence of the Grossman-Helpman model on the foundations of Bernheim and Whinston, 
as well as at more recent research based on common agency. A natural next step is then to 
look for aspects that the existing literature has not yet covered. In the pursuit of a common 
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agency model which would track the dynamics of real world politics, certain issues remain 
undiscovered. For instance, policies treated in the models are often chosen simultaneously 
with other policies, so this interdependence may need to be taken into account. In addition, 
there is a need for more studies with a dynamic framework that would take into account the 
long process of certain policy matters and the dimension of commitment to contribution offers 
and policy choices. 
 
One basic assumption in common agency models is that SIGs use monetary contributions as 
an influence tool. However, lobbying can also consist of transmitting useful information to 
politicians, or, more specifically, of combined forms of these two activities that are usually 
treated as each others’ substitutes. It is not yet well understood which way of influencing an 
interest group prefers, and what the relevant conditions for this choice are. A recent example 
of a model treating interest groups as providers of both information and contributions is the 
paper of Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) which, however, does not apply the common 
agency framework. Their idea could nevertheless be reproduced in such a setting as well. The 
paper investigates what mix of instruments an interest group should choose, and how the use 
of one instrument affects the effectiveness of the other. The authors identify an information 
externality that raises the cost of offering contributions, and it is shown that this indirect 
search cost reduces the group’s incentive to gather information when contributions are 
allowed.  
 
The model set up of Bennedsen and Feldmann is the following: interest groups and a decision 
maker are uncertain about some aspect of a policy decision; depending on the true nature of 
the uncertain aspect, the decision maker prefers either an outcome that favours an interest 
group or one that harms it. The interest group has the ability to gather information that may 
reduce the uncertainty, and it may therefore be in the position to provide the decision maker 
with useful information. The interest group will naturally only gather and transmit the 
information if it is in its interest to do so. Alternatively or additionally, the interest group may 
take advantage of the decision maker’s ignorance and induce her to choose the favourable 
outcome by offering campaign contributions.  
 
Collecting information and deciding not to provide it to the decision maker is information in 
itself, and a rational decision maker will make use of it. Independently of whether the interest 
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group’s search for information is observed by the decision maker, the collection of 
information creates an informational externality when it leads the decision maker to infer that 
the group is knowledgeable and is withholding its information. In conjunction with 
contributions, however, this information externality increases the cost of bribing the decision 
maker ex post. The information externality eventually reduces a single lobby group’s 
incentive to search for information. The results are slightly different in the presence of 
competitive lobbying. 
 
Moreover, as van Winden (2003) points out, there are multiple means and multiple channels 
for exercising lobbying, more than just contributions and information transmission. He adds 
structural coercion and representation on the list.  Structural coercion refers to constraints on 
the behaviour of a policymaker which are not related to influence attempts. The behaviour of 
voters forms a constraint of this type. Through the use of endorsements, or campaign 
contributions after policies have been determined, interest groups may affect voting and 
thereby influence the political process. In case of representation, interest groups try to get 
their interests directly represented among the policymakers. This may be achieved in different 
ways: through multiple positions and penetration where, for example via an election, a 
position of policymaker is obtained, or through ‘revolving doors’ (i.e. offering future career 
opportunities for politicians), or even through the development of social ties and affective 
bonds with politicians.  
 
There are no common agency models yet incorporating these means of influence. Extension 
of the so-called citizen-candidate model of representative democracy (see e.g. Besley and 
Coate, 2001) may be helpful, though, to deal with the penetration aspect. Real world 
representation of SIGs in the legislative process is reflected in the fact that the European 
Commission’s expert groups, which play an important role in the early stages of EU decision 
making, welcome outside input at the drafting stage. Thus, interest groups that get consulted 
are given a privileged access in the legislative process. As a consequence, these expert groups 
are a major focus for lobbyists (representing mainly business interests), who often succeed in 
getting a seat or even a position of dominance there (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2007).  
 
Reputation and credibility are issues that are often emphasized in the context of lobbying. 
Although the Commission is considered open and accessible, an interest group’s effectiveness 
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in influencing policy directly is determined by its ability to establish a positive reputation in 
the European political process (Coen, 2007). That is, by the extent to which it can establish its 
reputation as a provider of reliable, issue-specific and pan-European information. As an 
example, Nokia has managed to successfully build up a reputation of a reliable source of 
information which has given it a remarkable power in drafting policies that affect its own 
business environment (Kauppalehti, Jan 22, 2009).  
 
In the case of Nokia, two aspects are pronounced: credibility and direct influencing. In the 
turn of the millennium, Nokia started to lobby the Commission directly instead of relying on 
professional lobbies, and today, Nokia is among the very few Finnish companies that have 
managed to influence the EU legislation. In fact, the emergence of some 200 private lobbying 
agencies of firms in Brussels reveals that direct influencing has gained support and that the 
corporate lobbying activities are becoming more and more professional. After the 
establishment of a private lobbying agency in 1994, Nokia has managed to build up 
credibility and a solid reputation in relation to the Commission and is now able to have its say 
in issues that are related to its business activity. Thus, credibility and a good reputation clearly 
improve an interest group’s stand in the game, so that incorporating this aspect into the 
models might offer new insights. A more widespread use of dynamic common agency settings 
may be useful in addressing this topic.  
 
Persson, Tabellini, and Roland (2000) discuss the institutional differences between a 
congressional regime of the U.S. type and a parliamentary regime of the European type. 
According to them, lobbying is quite fragmented in the United States as interest groups 
interact mainly with individual lawmakers. In Europe, on the other hand, interest groups are 
generally larger and have more symbiotic relations with political parties. This pattern could 
reflect the differences across political regimes: presidential-congressional regimes have 
greater separation of proposal powers among individual legislators, whereas the institutions of 
parliamentary regimes produce legislative cohesion in the form of stable coalitions within and 
across parties. This being said, models focusing on policy making in a country with a certain 
political regime should pay attention to the specificities in the institutional structure of the 
government which determines to some extent the role and activities of SIGs.    
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Other issues to be still taken into account include for example the impact of emotions and 
feelings in decision making, and the internal dynamics of interest groups. Affective social ties 
in the interaction between a policymaker and an interest group would not only imply that the 
former may be willing to benefit the latter without compensation, but also that the interest 
group may care about the interests of the policymaker. In addition, interest groups are 
commonly assumed to act as single, unitary actors. Nevertheless, the internal cohesion and 
dynamics of group members has an impact on the lobbying efficiency of the group, so SIG 
heterogeneity on this dimension may be as well be a fruitful addition to the models.  
 
7  Conclusion 
This study has reviewed models of endogenous policy theory, and in particular the most 
recognized contribution to the literature, namely the common agency model of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). The aim has been to build a fairly broad picture of how the Grossman-
Helpman model compares with preceding endogenous policy models and how the common 
agency tradition has developed in theoretical literature since the introduction of the Protection 
for Sale article in the early 1990s.  
 
The political contribution approach of Grossman and Helpman was an advancement in 
relation to earlier approaches for treating endogenous political decision making in that it 
provided stronger microfoundations for the government’s and lobbies’ objective functions. It 
also offered a pluralistic view of the political decisions by including all actors involved in the 
process; the government or politician, interest groups as well as all sectors of the economy. 
As a consequence, the model does not include black boxes which some of its earlier 
counterparts were guilty of. One central process is however treated as exogenous; the 
equilibrium number of organized interest groups is taken as given and thus the factors that 
drive the formation of lobby groups lack a comprehensive treatment in the Grossman-
Helpman model.  
 
This shortcoming, as well as some other abstentions from reality of the basic model, have 
however been discussed in later research literature. The issue of endogenous lobbies has been 
tackled insightfully by Mitra (1999) whose augmented version of the Grossman-Helpman 
model has gained recognition and a kind of status as the standard model of endogenous lobby 
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formation. The essence of Mitra’s work was to add one preliminary stage to the GH model, 
where SIGs decide whether to get organized and face the fixed costs, but also the lobbying 
possibilities, that it brings about.  
 
Other issues added to the basic model include asymmetric information and hierarchical 
government structure both of which have attracted several academic contributions during the 
21st century. Asymmetric information may actualize as uncertainty about the weight that the 
politician puts on social welfare, about the politician’s ideological strength, about his policy 
preferences, or about the distribution of power in the government’s decision-making process. 
The treatment of structural hierarchies offers also numerous alternatives for modelling 
purposes, as the hierarchy may come about in the separation of a legislature and a 
bureaucracy, a president and a parliament, or a national versus a municipal tier to name only a 
few.  Common for the results obtained from the models treating information asymmetries and 
hierarchical governments is that in both of the settings the influencing power of SIGs is 
clearly weakened in the political process.  
 
Other aspects that have been given attention in recent common agency literature are for 
example the inclusion of a foreign government or multiple agents in the model, the analysis of 
non-quasilinear individual preferences, other than truthful contributions and equilibria, and 
dynamic game-theoretic settings. All these contributions have enriched the basic Grossman-
Helpman model and proved its usefulness in more general settings than mere trade policy 
formation.  
 
The multiplicity of existing models speaks of the multiplicity of forms that lobbying can take 
and the complexity of political decision-making processes. Thus, it is natural that there 
remain still issues that the existing common agency models have neglected. Some ideas and 
thoughts that have surfaced while going through the surveyed literature were spelled out in 
the last chapter in order to offer some kindling for further research. There seems to be a need 
for more research with a dynamic perspective and for more models that combine contribution 
offers with informative lobbying. Research also needs to go beyond the common assumption 
of exogenously given groups that are of fixed size and behave as unitary actors. Despite the 
general recognition of the Olsonian hypotheses on the logic of collective action, the 
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formation, dynamics, and internal politics of interest groups are also still generally neglected 
topics in common agency models.  
 
Besides contributions and information transmission, other forms and channels of influence, 
such as interest group’s penetration into actual politics, and socio-emotional ties to politicians, 
could also be discussed in common agency models. Furthermore, the tendency of individuals 
to base their decisions on feelings and emotions instead of rational reasoning, could generate 
new insights if parameterized in the models. Finally, credibility and reputation building seems 
to be crucial in real life lobbying so that this aspect, along with other aspects arising out of 
empirics, could get more accentuated in theoretical research.  
 
As a final remark, while a long list of neglected topics in common agency models could be 
drawn, there remains a trade-off between the inclusion of realistic, often complicative 
assumptions, and the traceability of the model. Therefore, it is sometimes justified to leave 
aside certain additional assumptions, however realistic they might be, that seem to weaken the 
message or the ease of use of the model. This should naturally not discourage further research 
on the topic of special interest groups and their influence in policy formation.  
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